


# Janus: The Undergraduate History Journal

Fall 2019



University of Maryland: Department of History <https://www.umdjanus.com>

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## *Diffamatio: Sodomy as a Tool of Defamation in the Medieval Era*

By Jonathan Bramell

The definition of “sodomy” is a major source of scholarly debate, often punctuated by the fact that its meaning changes in context of its location and time period. Though in the modern day it is closely tethered to ideas towards homosexuality, during the medieval period it was ancillary to bestiality, masturbation, and adultery. Some scholars suggest that sodomy is an umbrella term, encompassing non-sexual acts such as usury, blasphemy, and even ethnicity, stressing that it is “often used to control boundaries between pure and the impure, rights and wrongs, the indigenous and the foreign.”<sup>1</sup> Noting how fickle the term is, sodomy as it relates to homosexuality was already imbedded into medieval knowledge regimes by the twelfth century, and is clearly identified within primary sources. Peter Damian, an eleventh century monk, notes that anal intercourse is the gravest “form of criminal wickedness.”<sup>2</sup> This familiarity with same-sex practices was also reflected in the literary world of the late fourteenth century, as the poem *Cleanness* outlines how leading an “unclean” life is abominable to God. In the poem, the author alludes to the tale of Lot and his escape from the city of Sodom. It reads,

I am nearing there now and will know for myself  
If they're really as wretched as rumors suggest  
There a lust they have learned that I like not at all;  
In their Flesh they have found this gross fault, far the worst.  
Every male's vile mate is a man like himself;  
And with one like a woman, two wickedly join<sup>3</sup>  
(ll.690-696)

Although it had gained the moniker of “unspeakable sin” to circumvent speaking of it explicitly, ideas around same-sex relations began to circulate among scholars, with it often being levered as a tool to discredit others.<sup>4</sup> However, echoing Robert Ian Moore’s thesis, the creation and circulation of these ideas did not stay within the intelligentsia, but was also distilled to the lower classes.<sup>5</sup> As it entered popular thought, the medieval period would cement same-sex relations as indivisible from the label of sodomy, and accusations would become an effective tool for defamation since “it makes ‘known’ what eludes scrutiny.”<sup>6</sup> In the latter portion of the period (1400-1500), being labelled as a “sodomite” could lead to severe punishments, including being burned at the stake.<sup>7</sup> This mirrors the anxieties faced by those who are LGBT+ today. While it is inappropriate and cavalier to depict the image and treatment of medieval sodomites as analogous to the modern LGBT+ community, the seeds of persecutory practice against those in the Queer movement appear to be planted during the eleventh through fifteenth centuries. In many societies, including the United States, being accused of being a homosexual (whether the accused is or is not) has damning social repercussions. As sodomy became a more severe offense and accusations became more damning, it became a vehicle of vitriolic criticism further entrenching prejudice towards those who partook in same-sex relations. In this paper, I will explore the roots of the rhetorical power behind sodomy accusations and argue that the growth of popular prejudice towards same-sex activities is closely tethered to defamation practices. To begin this investigation, one must survey the period’s religious discourse, contexts of political accusations, and examples of social anxieties.

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<sup>1</sup> Helmut Puff. *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400-1600*. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003) p.7.

<sup>2</sup> Peter Damian, *Book of Gomorrah*, trans. Pierre J. Payer (Waterloo, Ont: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1982), p. 29. This source was accessed through the Fordham University’s *Internet Medieval Source Book*.

<sup>3</sup> Anonymous, “Cleanness” in *The Complete Works of the Pearl Poet*, trans. Casey Finch. (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1993) p. 133.

<sup>4</sup> Matthew Kuefler, “Male Friendship and the Suspicion of Sodomy” in *Gender and Difference in the Middle Ages*. Sharon Farmer, Carol Braun. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003) p. 147.

<sup>5</sup> Robert Ian Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Authority and Deviance in Western Europe, 950-1250*. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008) p.4.

<sup>6</sup> Helmut Puff. *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400-1600*. p.109.

<sup>7</sup> Helmut Puff. *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400-1600*. p.94. Bearing in mind that the focus of this paper is centered between 1000 and 1500, sodomy was often paired with other charges, however it would be dealt with more harshly (i.e. execution) and frequently around the latter portion of this period.

To understand the rhetorical power behind labelling someone a “sodomite,” as well as the growing potential for it to be used for defamation, one must investigate the religious discourse of the Gregorian reforms. Prior to the eleventh century (and even after the Gregorian reforms), animosity towards same-sex relations was not universal. Priests were often satirized in literature, capitalizing off of their close living arrangements, as licentious for both women and boys.<sup>8</sup> Though there was a growing emphasis on the ascetic rejection of love and lust, virginity, and abstinence, homosexuality remained as a discussed topic into the early twelfth century as it only becomes a taboo topic around the latter half of the period.<sup>9</sup> Before the construction of the “unspeakable sin,” Anselm of Bec urged the church that penances for homosexuality should be moderated in a clement fashion.<sup>10</sup> Ecclesiastics were most likely aware of widely accepted practices of homoeroticism, and that “this sin has been so public that hardly anyone has blushed for it, and many, therefore, have plunged into it without realizing its gravity.”<sup>11</sup>

However, the eleventh century would be a time of major reconfiguration for the church, as the East–West Schism of 1054, general opposition Gregorian reforms, and parallel Investiture controversy would challenge the goals of centralizing the papacy and its roles in stately affairs. Some scholars make the claim that the vilification of same-sex relations was an unanticipated consequence of asserting sacerdotal celibacy, and that it was secondary to tightening the control over the organization.<sup>12</sup> However, the placement of celibacy, and by extension anti-homosexuality, alongside issues of simony shows that concerns over the church’s “lax sexual morale” was an integral component of the perceived institutional lack of discipline. Debates were had over celibacy in a manner that echoed of early Christian discourse, as reformers portrayed sexual acts as deeply sinful.<sup>13</sup> Outspoken figures such as Peter Damian, Thomas Aquinas and Anselm of Bec would argue in favor of instituting and preserving clerical celibacy, which would become mandatory with the First Lateran Council in 1123.<sup>14</sup> The recognition and institution of the canons from the First Lateran Council would mark a shift for same-sex relations, since the image of homosexuality had gone from a moral mishap, to a damnable sin within the optic of the church. In the discussions over clerical celibacy, a heavier stigma would be placed upon *sodomia*, as both sides would accuse the other of it. The geography of the sin would be further outlined in the *Liber Gomorrhianus* by pro-reformist Peter Damian. Puff notes that when both sides debated issues of clerical marriage, they “promulgated images of Sodom” to strengthen their cases against one another.<sup>15</sup> The evocation of the image of Sodom signifies that both sides used sodomy as a lever over one another to weaken the oppositions arguments, effectively laying the roots to a defamatory tactic tethered to a label that will grow in power.

When looking at the way the church treats homosexuality, the ideology behind it is found in its purest form, and said ideology gets disseminated to the masses through secular powers. As this knowledge is passed down the class structure, the ideology is appropriated and changed in a way that best fits the respective class. Considering that the church serves as the cradle of the medieval knowledge regime, and is closely tethered to the nobility, this revitalized

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<sup>8</sup> Ruth Mazo Karras, *Sexuality in Medieval Europe: Doing Unto Others*. (New York, Routledge Press, 2017) p.135

<sup>9</sup> David F. Greenberg, Marcia H. Bystryn. “Christian Intolerance of Homosexuality” in *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol. 88, no. 3, (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1982). p.528. It should be noted that the modern way we use the term homosexual may not be fully applicable to medieval peoples. Also, anti-homosexual sentiment is not exclusive to Christianity in this late classical period, as Greenberg and Bystryn point out that homosexual prostitution was banned in the Roman empire prior to the empire’s Christianisation. It is believed by Greenberg and Bystryn that both paganism and Christianity had leaned towards a broad trend toward asceticism, thus antagonistic to same-sex relations.

<sup>10</sup> David F. Greenberg, Marcia H. Bystryn. “Christian Intolerance of Homosexuality” p.531.

<sup>11</sup> David F. Greenberg, Marcia H. Bystryn. “Christian Intolerance of Homosexuality” p.531. This quote is drawn from Harford Montgomery Hyde’s comments about the clergy’s awareness to homoerotic depictions of men in poetry.

<sup>12</sup> David F. Greenberg, Marcia H. Bystryn. “Christian Intolerance of Homosexuality” pp.534-535.

<sup>13</sup> David F. Greenberg, Marcia H. Bystryn. “Christian Intolerance of Homosexuality” Early Christian writings were generally antagonistic to homosexuality as an extension of a general aversion to sexual pleasure.

<sup>14</sup> Drawn from notes taken in HIST 331 with Dr. Bianchini.

<sup>15</sup> Helmut Puff. *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400-1600*. p.110. Puff notes that “defenders of clerical marriage argued that sins of all kinds, but those against nature most notably, were the obvious outcome of enforcing prohibitions against marriage among the clergy.” This signifies that both sides of the argument subscribed to what would be considered “homophobic” dogma (set up by early Christian ascetics), but also to some that sodomy was a rational result to prohibition. That implies a clerical familiarity that same-sex relations take place within the institution of the clergy, and a widespread vulnerability.

polemic found itself in secular political affairs. Kuefler makes the point that using accusations of sodomy serves an auxiliary purpose for “ecclesiastical and royal hierarchies, who were attempting large-scale social and political reforms that required the subversion of male solidarity.”<sup>16</sup> This can serve as a direct attack against feudal bonds (notably military bonds), where male proximity could be used as a tool of defamation. The rhetoric of chivalry and vassalage often contained expressions of submission and “love” for a lord or comrade in arms, which formed a homoerotic platform to launch accusations of sexual vice.<sup>17</sup> As the centuries pressed on, sodomy and anti-homosexual rhetoric began to permeate through these political attacks. In the words of Puff, “the charge of sodomy became a more or less routine ingredient of political and social invective, just when secular penalties for homosexual practices were becoming markedly more savage.”<sup>18</sup> An example of this is found during the Gregorian reforms, when King Henry IV (r.1056-1105) would oppose centralizing efforts, prompting the Investiture conflict between himself and Pope Gregory VII (r.1073-1085)<sup>19</sup> During the conflict, Henry IV would be attacked with claims of *sodomia*.<sup>20</sup> While some would dispute the notion that homosexuality is entailed in the term *sodomia*, Peter Damian’s writings and Wido of Ferrara’s claim that Henry IV “enjoyed the frequent company of boys and very old men” point to it having a connotation, even though he doubles back claiming a lack of evidence that it was “in vice.”<sup>21</sup> The Henry IV accusation is notable as it provides an example of an early willingness to lever claims of sodomy onto secular rulers. What is also interesting about the timing is that it appears during a period in which the geography of sodomy is being explored by clerics, reflecting the fact that the religious discourse that is currently taking place (even in its most prototypic form) is inextricable from political affairs. Another notable monarch accused of *sodomia* is Edward II (r.1307-1327), who is accused of having a homosexual relationship with Hugh Despenser the Younger in Jean Froissart’s *Chronicles*. When Froissart describes the execution of Hugh Despenser, he states.

When he had been tied up, his member and his testicles were first cut off, because he was a heretic and a sodomite, even, it was said, with the King, and this was why the King had driven away the Queen on his suggestion. When his private parts had been cut off they were thrown into the fire to burn.<sup>22</sup>

Furthermore, after Edward II was imprisoned and deposed by an army led by his wife, Isabella of France, rumors about his death began to circulate that stated he had died after having a hot poker forced up his anus.<sup>23</sup> While it is highly unlikely that he died in such a fashion, the circulation of the rumor reflects the way how political regimes can benefit (accuser), or suffer (defamed), from popular vilification of homosexual relationships. In the case of Edward II, whether or not he had been sexually involved with Hugh Despenser, the rumor recognized the societal roles they played as lord and vassal. In the rumor, the fabricators reversed the power dynamic by having the King die by being penetrated and having Hugh dismembered.<sup>24</sup> Edward II’s death is a deliberate attack on his masculinity, and seeing that he failed militarily against his wife, it echoes Kuefler when he states that sodomy narratives, “replied directly to the traditions of masculinity among the military aristocracy, even if they attempted to parody or to subvert vert those traditions.”<sup>25</sup> This ties into the *diffamatio*, the practice of attacking another’s renown, was closely tied to *fama*, an

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<sup>16</sup> Matthew Kuefler, “Male Friendship and the Suspicion of Sodomy” p.132.

<sup>17</sup> Matthew Kuefler, “Male Friendship and the Suspicion of Sodomy” p.132. This also is drawing from lecture of HIST 331 on the topic of fealty, during which military bonds between monarch and lord was explored. In cultivating these military bonds, the language used is very reminiscent of love poetry at the time. While the intention is likely not to condone homosexual acts, it does come off as homoerotic to modern optics. It was also possible that people during the medieval period may have recognized this homoeroticism in the language and exploited in the various accusations that are made during the period.

<sup>18</sup> Helmut Puff. *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400-1600*. p.111.

<sup>19</sup> Drawing on lecture notes from HIST 331. As for the dates affixed to King Henry IV, it was decided to use his reign affixed to his title as Holy Roman Emperor.

<sup>20</sup> Helmut Puff. *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400-1600*. p.110.

<sup>21</sup> Helmut Puff. *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400-1600*. p.110. His Wideo of Ferrara claim originates in the *Libelli de lite*.

<sup>22</sup> Jean Froissart. *Chronicles*, trans. Geoffrey Brereton (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1985.) p.44.

<sup>23</sup> Kathryn Warner, *Edward II: The Unconventional King*. (Shroud, Gloucestershire, Amberley Publishing, 2014) pp.243-244. While Froissart does not cover the death or disappearance of Edward II, it is suggested that the first appearance of this rumour is in Ranulph Higden’s *Polychronicon*.

<sup>24</sup> No pun intended.

<sup>25</sup> Matthew Kuefler, “Male Friendship and the Suspicion of Sodomy” pp.151-152.

individual's reputation.<sup>26</sup> When expressing political dissatisfaction by insinuating someone in a sodomite, protecting one's *fama* goes from warding off an *ad-hominem* attack, to addressing an accusation of a sin that is shrouded in the ineffable.<sup>27</sup> The imagery of the hot poker, though explicit, reflects the underlying imagination and awareness surrounding the unspeakable sin. Considering that these accusations address societal superiors, the label of "sodomite" is incredibly powerful, bracketing an individual into an "other" category in which they must prove their normativity or suffer the blemish against their character and salvation, or death later on in the period.

In both Henry IV's and Edward II's accounts, a shroud of suspicion is raised around a leader to undermine their social importance, but the implications behind it also attacks many institutions where homosociality is a major element. The aforementioned monastic orders and their close living arrangements, women in court, and chivalric institutions become targets for accusations of sodomy, echoing social ascetic anxieties of having homosocial spaces. Famously, the Knights Templar were accused of condoning acts of heresy, and the charge of sodomy was also thrown in (rather effectively) to further confirm fears of it being a corrupt order. This phenomenon is echoed in the literature of the period, as writers configure their stories in manner that reflect prevailing views on religious virtues. As Kuefler states,

By using a variety of the texts spanning the twelfth century, moreover, we can more easily mark the progress of the suspicion of sodomy in male friendships over the course of that century. While it is impossible to pinpoint an exact date at which men's friendships became suspect, it is possible to demonstrate a broad shift in attitudes from early-twelfth-century twelfth-century texts to later twelfth-century ones.<sup>28</sup>

One of the examples provided by Kuefler is in the *Chason de Roland*, where the antagonist, Ganelon, is depicted as attractive before his treachery is known. The speaker states, "Noble was his body and his torso was broad, and so handsome was he that all his peers stare at him."<sup>29</sup> The Song of Roland was composed sometime around the First Crusade, and the depiction of men being taken by male beauty is written in a fashion that suggests the composer views it as unproblematic. Throughout the song, it depicts the bonds between brothers in arms (notably Oliver and Roland) as one rooted in love for one another. However, the homosocial community of men is used as a punchline in one of the *Lais* of Marie de France. The story of Lanval, follows a hero who shares the name of the title, and in staying faithful to his love, he rejects Queen Guinevere's sexual advances. Chiding him for his apparent homosexual (as opposed to loyal) behavior, he is seen as a communal vulnerability. Queen Guinevere states,

I well believe that you do not like this kind of pleasure. I have been told often enough that you have no desire for women. You have well-trained young men and enjoy yourself with them. Base coward, wicked recreant, my lord is extremely unfortunate to have suffered you near him. I think he may have lost his [King Arthur] salvation because of it.<sup>30</sup>

When placing the texts alongside one another, it highlights a shift from the idealization and appreciation of the male form, to a prejudiced stance towards perceived homoeroticism. As the medieval period progresses, the belief that homosexuality is disruptive to the social fabric becomes ingrained in the literary practice by the late thirteenth century, manifesting itself in Marie de France's work as Guinevere expressing concern over King Arthur's salvation. Unlike

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<sup>26</sup> Helmut Puff. *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400-1600*. p.112.

<sup>27</sup> Helmut Puff. *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400-1600*. p.114. Puff alludes to an account where late councilman Johann Greeffroide was accused of sodomy, and after a witness confessed to being one of his sexual partners, the affair was covered up by the local clergy and attempts to restore his *fama* were made. The idea of ensuring that a figure, such as Edward II, is remembered as a sodomite lies within the creation and justification of a political regime of truth. It serves to legitimize a contender to one's power or memory. In the case of Henry IV, it was not as successful, however, Edward II is remembered as one of England's less than stellar kings.

<sup>28</sup> Matthew Kuefler, "Male Friendship and the Suspicion of Sodomy" p.153.

<sup>29</sup> Matthew Kuefler, "Male Friendship and the Suspicion of Sodomy" p.168 Kuefler draws from Pierre Jonin's translation of the *Chanson de Roland* made in 1979.

<sup>30</sup> Marie de France, *The Lais of Marie de France*, trans. Glyn S. Burgess, Keith Busby. (London: Penguin Books, 1999) p.76. I found the quote originally in the Matthew Kuefler article "Male Friendship and the Suspicion of Sodomy" on page 178, and he uses K. Warnke's 1925 translation of the *Lai de Lanval*. I decided against using that version of the quote because it did not address the communal threat of Lanval's perceived homosexuality, or Guinevere's insults. Furthermore, the translation was from 1925, and was dated in comparison to the 1999 version.

some of the other marginalized communities in the medieval period, homosexuals and individuals that were accused under the label of sodomy could potentially be anyone, as they were not a distinct category of people.<sup>31</sup> As authors of the period bear in mind that exposure to sinfulness could corrupt anyone's character, they codify this prejudice into the literary culture.

What is interesting to note is that the perceived vulnerabilities from homosocial institutions are projected onto females (especially nunneries) akin to males, although the practice of defamation would remain heavily gendered towards men. Women during the medieval period were viewed through a crushingly misogynistic lens, as the prevailing perception points to them having less agency over their own morality and actions, making them more susceptible to vice.<sup>32</sup> Compared to men, who's social position postured them to be more engaged in public life (heads of households, etc), a woman's integrity was tethered closely to her virginity, and not much else.<sup>33</sup> This view of women as susceptible to "desires of the flesh" offers an explanation on how women were impinged with a rigid expectation of chastity, being guarded from what was believed to be their autoerotic and homoerotic desires.<sup>34</sup> As the sin of sodomy, and homosexual practice became a more damning offense, women who deviated from sexual norms. While possibly an example of transgender identity, the account of Katherina Hetzendorfer in 1477 serves as a case where "female homoeroticism inhabits the same category as male homoeroticism – the two women's crime was described as sodomitical vice."<sup>35</sup> While the men investigating the case are profoundly befuddled by Hetzendorfer's actions, they viewed him/her as a threat to the moral integrity of the community, as s/he confronted women's perceived sexual vulnerability. By this time, the punishment for sodomy could result in death, and Hetzendorfer was killed for having sex with another woman.<sup>36</sup>

Sodomy, with all of its religious connotations, would unfortunately continue to be punishable by death well into the early modern era. There are many places in the twenty-first century that still see homosexuality as a capital offense. Being labelled as a homosexual, much like the medieval era, can have a damning effect on one's relationship with their community, or their physical well-being. The danger and shame affixed to "unspeakable sin" in the medieval period, are roots in a sinister tree, which helped build the closet that many people in LGBT+ are forced into. Many of the struggles faced by the LGBT+ community can be traced to decisions that were made roughly 1000 years ago, a major one being the propagation of non-heterosexuals as an "other." One of the false values in recognizing Robert Ian Moore's "top-down" approach to medieval persecution is that there is surface hope that permeates; that common people cannot be held accountable for the atrocities committed against those who did not fit societal expectations. Because these persecutory ideas were handed down to the lay people through intellectual and cultural elites, there is a risk if one is not careful, of facilitating of complacency in oppressive social structures. There is hope however, that if one recognizes where rhetoric of persecution comes from, that steps can be taken to make the unspeakable sin a memory.

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<sup>31</sup> Helmut Puff. *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400-1600*. p.109.

<sup>32</sup> Helmut Puff, *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400-1600*. p.116.

<sup>33</sup> Helmut Puff, *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400-1600*. p.116.

<sup>34</sup> Sauer, Michelle M. "Uncovering Difference: Encoded Homoerotic Anxiety within the Christian Eremitic Tradition in Medieval England." *Journal of the History of Sexuality*. Vol 19, no. 1, (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press ,2010). p.137. The author also quotes Georges Duby's "The Aristocratic Households of France, Communal Living," in *A History of Private Life*, stating the women would often be kept under lock and key in rooms isolated from the rest of the house, stemming out of underlying anxieties that women may behave promiscuously.

<sup>35</sup> Helmut Puff. *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400-1600*. p.32.

<sup>36</sup> Helmut Puff. *Sodomy in Reformation Germany and Switzerland, 1400-1600*. p.32.

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# The Prophet and the King: A Comparison of the Rebellions of al-Muqanna and Babak

Clay Capra

## Introduction

In the years following the ascension of the Abbasid caliphate, a number of revolts broke out across Iran against the new dynasty. Fueled by the radical religious, political, and social ideals of the Hashemite revolution, these rebels were often identified with an obscure religion called Khurramism.<sup>1</sup> Most of these revolts were fairly short-lived, with the exception of those of Babak Khorramdin and al-Muqanna, who operated at essentially opposite ends of Iran with around 40 years between the end of al-Muqanna's revolt and the beginning of Babak's. Chroniclers considered their movements part of the same religious trend but, due to their geographical and temporal distances, I want to inspect the extent to which they presented the same ideological program. In order to discuss this, I will first outline the political, social, and personal backgrounds for both of the two revolts, as well as how the two leaders presented themselves. Then, I will discuss the people, organizations, and groups which formed their bases of support. After that, I will discuss their reasons for revolt and their goals, either stated or inferred from their actions. Finally, I will synthesize these points into a discussion of the ideological programs which the two leaders put forward. I will argue that Babak's revolution presented a definitively more political and social ideology when compared to al-Muqanna's more religious ideology, and that the difference between these two stems from the greater class tensions existing in Azerbaijan when compared to Khurasan.

## Part 1: Background and Presentation

The religious and political backdrop for both revolts lies in the Hashemite revolution. Organizers of the revolution based their operations in Khurasan, and many of the people who flocked to the movement must have been ethnically Iranian.<sup>2</sup> Under the Umayyads, many non-Arabs felt as though, despite conversions to Islam, they still occupied a lower rung of society than their Arab Muslim counterparts. The Hashemite revolutionaries made a twofold claim: the first part being that they would end the unfair treatment of non-Arabs, and the second being that they would restore a member of the prophet's family to the throne. As the Umayyads came from a family that originally opposed Muhammad, the second claim carried particular weight. However, when the Abbasids did overthrow the Umayyads, they took the caliphate themselves, claiming descent from Abbas, an uncle of Muhammad, straining relations between themselves and the 'Alid branch of their supporters. When al-Mansur, the second caliph, assassinated Abu Muslim, a powerful figure who orchestrated the rise of the Abbasids but remained in Khurasan, a final nail was struck into the coffin for a large portion of the revolutionary coalition.

As for Abu Muslim himself, he was a man of uncertain origin, possibly a first generation convert of Iranian descent. When most of the Hashemite forces swept down into Mesopotamia to overthrow the Umayyads, he remained with his army in Khurasan to finish the process of pacifying the province. As mentioned before, however, his assassination at the hands of al-Mansur left this army without a leader, now existing only as a threat to established Abbasid power structures. To these soldiers, "the murder of their master meant the end of everything they had hoped for, and briefly enjoyed, proving that there was no room for them in Muslim society after all...In effect, they were being sent back to their villages again."<sup>3</sup> They felt victimized, and now with military experience and the recent memory of a revolutionary religious program, they quickly revolted again. Sunbad, one of Abu Muslim's generals, revolted only two months after his death, reverting to his previous religion of Zoroastrianism.<sup>4</sup> He called upon millenarian, apocalyptic rhetoric often used during the Hashemite revolution.<sup>5</sup> Clearly, these ideas, despite Abu Muslim's death and the end of the revolution, would continue to hold power throughout Iran for years come.

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<sup>1</sup> For this introduction, I'll be referring to the revolution and its forces as Hashemite, as not all of them necessarily fought for the establishment of the Abbasid caliphate which came to be in the revolution's wake. Once the caliphate is established, I will refer to it as Abbasid.

<sup>2</sup> Patricia Crone, *The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 18.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, 20-21

<sup>4</sup> Parvaneh Pourshariati, *Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire* (London: I.B. Taurus & Co Ltd, 2008), 437.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, 445.

Both revolutionaries drew came from societies in turmoil, drawing upon this discontent in order to create their own movements. Al-Muqanna, like the Hashemites, built his base of power in Khurasan. The region had been in essentially constant revolt since the late Umayyad period, and Abu Muslim even spent a large portion of his time exterminating real or imagined rebellious enemies of his own revolution.<sup>6</sup> By the time al-Muqanna revolted, “three revolts of quite a different nature,” all of which involved “purges, the disbanding of defeated armies, the burning of villages, the stringing up of people on gallows, the flight of peasants from their land, and increased taxation on the survivors” had already wracked the region.<sup>7</sup> In short, the political environment was one in which “one might be better off as a rebel than as a passive victim.”<sup>8</sup> Babak, on the other hand, revolted in Azerbaijan, a region on essentially the other end of Iran. Until the Abbasids took power, little to no Arab colonization had occurred in the mountains of Azerbaijan. Afterwards, many Arab Muslims began moving into the region, a trend which continued for around 50 years before Babak’s revolt began in earnest. As these Arab magnates entered the territory, they collected large amounts of land, and by the time of Babak’s birth they held incredible power in the region.<sup>9</sup> The old elite was ousted, and large numbers of formerly landed farmers found themselves made into landless peasants by the new magnates. Due to this social upheaval, political power rested in the control of castles built high above villages, and the only accepted currency of such power was military strength.<sup>10</sup> As such, a second group of powerholders formed: roving bandits, raiders, and mercenaries called sa’alik, who contributed to the general decline in rural order by their propensity to take jobs from both rebels and government forces, raid villages when short on work, and generally cause trouble.<sup>11</sup> Babak himself came from the “landless, footloose sector of village society who supplied manual labour to the Arab warlords of the area,” which probably made up an increasingly large subsector of the rural poor as these trends continued.<sup>12</sup>

These two differing personal and political backgrounds led to each revolutionary taking a different path to power and, once acquiring it, presenting themselves in different ways. Babak, as mentioned, came from essentially the lowest social class, but eventually came to work for Javidhan, the leader of a Khurrami organization. Eventually, he converted and joined this organization, and when Javidhan died in a feud with another of these cult societies, Babak came to power. His followers apparently saw him as “the grandson of Abu Muslim, a descendant of Fatima, the daughter of Abu Muslim.”<sup>13</sup> Supposedly, he made the claim himself.<sup>14</sup> However, as this does not appear in ibn al-Nadim’s *Fihrist* at all, it is possible that later Muslim chroniclers simply connected the two rebellious figures themselves, or perhaps connected Babak with other Khurramis that made similar claims about their connections to Abu Muslim and assumed he did the same. Al-Muqanna, on the other hand, served in the Hashemite revolution itself, and maybe in the army of Abu Muslim.<sup>15</sup> In fact, when he and his Turkish allies later conquered Samarqand after the rebellion began, either he or the Turkish khagan took the title of “king of Sogdia” and began minting coins that displayed al-Muqanna’s image, declaring him the “avenger (*wali*) of Abu Muslim.”<sup>16</sup> After Abu Muslim’s death, he remained as a clerk in Khurasan through the next two governors, but when ‘Abd al-Jabbar, the second of these, fell from power due to his involvement in an attempted ‘Alid coup, al-Muqanna was possibly taken to Baghdad and certainly jailed for his involvement.<sup>17</sup> Even before this, however, he may have been making the claim of prophecy. When he was released, however, he took up the mantle of a “new messenger of God.”<sup>18</sup> He claimed that the spirit of god had entered him through a succession of incarnations, passing through Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Muhammad, and possibly Abu Muslim, finally passing to him.<sup>19</sup> Presenting himself as the Mahdi, he carried an apocalyptic message

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<sup>6</sup> Patricia Crone, *The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 114.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 120.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 59.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 56.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

<sup>13</sup> Kathryn Babayan, *Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 138.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 269.

<sup>15</sup> Patricia Crone, *The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 107-108.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 109-110.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 111.

<sup>19</sup> William F. Tucker, *Mahdis and Millenarians* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 112.

as the last prophet.<sup>20</sup> The most noticeable feature of his personal presentation was, of course, his veil made of heavy green or gold silk that covered his whole face, including his eyes, from which he got his title al-Muqanna, meaning “the veiled one.”<sup>21</sup> The colors of his veil possibly draw from the description in the Quran that those living in Eden wear “green silk and heavy brocade.”<sup>22</sup> The veil’s religious significance came from the fact that he, as a divine entity, could not be viewed by mortals directly, and may have drawn from the idea of the Maitreya Buddha, also presented as too bright or beautiful to behold.<sup>23</sup> Sassanid kings may have also veiled their faces for the same reason.<sup>24</sup>

## Part 2: Bases of Support

Babak’s inheritance of Javidhan’s Khurrami cult society gave him the basis from which to build his own rebellion. Javidhan’s widow publicly claimed that her late husband’s spirit had passed into Babak and she married him, granting him control of the organization.<sup>25</sup> These societies were structured in such a way that many subordinate leaders of their own societies all answered to Babak, in a similar fashion of networks of lord-vassal relationships.<sup>26</sup> Beyond this society, his main base of power came from the villages, in which systems of local chieftains pledged themselves to Babak, bringing their people along with them.<sup>27</sup> Additionally, he probably drew upon the large, armed population of sa’alik. Many of his followers may have come from subsets of rural society that felt as though they were losing social position and prestige due to Arab colonization, such as local elite who fell out of favor or land-owning farmers who became sharecroppers.<sup>28</sup> Despite this support, however, Babak never felt the need to develop any real organized system of rule, and the only structure he developed beyond that of the cult society was his army, which included cavalry, infantry, officers, and was at least partially standing.<sup>29</sup> The decision to focus entirely on military power rather than administrative structure may be due to the fact that he, like the magnates and sa’alik, appears to have based his political power in the fear of his military power. His tactics were brutal, he used fear to keep the Armenian princes as his allies and possibly even the peasants of the territories he controlled himself in support of him, and perhaps he hoped that he could strike such fear into everyone around him that they would either submit to his rule or leave his territory.<sup>30</sup> Since Babak came from a society in which only military strength garnered political power, it makes sense that he would have built his own power base along the same lines.

Al-Muqanna, on the other hand, came from a society in which religious fervor and social unrest had brought about a number of rebellions already. His rebels seem to have originated mostly from two sources: Iranian peasant communities and Turkish nomads.<sup>31</sup> The Iranians in his army mostly came from villages, whereas the Turks came from Turkestan, some of which joined him for the opportunistic reasons of gaining plunder, but others of which certainly joined due to religious or political concerns.<sup>32</sup> Many ex-soldiers, thugs, brigands, and other semi-military types also found their way into his army.<sup>33</sup> Unlike Babak, he did not draw from an existing cult society, and instead drew from “his experience as a member of the Hashimiyya,” sending out missionaries and gaining followers in a similar manner as them.<sup>34</sup> His missionaries specifically targeted a group that seems to predate him called the white-clothed ones, one of the two major Khurrami groups in the region. The color of their clothes seems to represent

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<sup>20</sup> Patricia Crone, *The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 128-130.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, 130.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, 132.

<sup>24</sup> Kathryn Babayan, *Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 72.

<sup>25</sup> Muhammad ibn Ishaq ibn al-Nadim, *The Fihrist of al-Nadim*, trans. Bayard Dodge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 821.

<sup>26</sup> Patricia Crone, *The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 62.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, 60-61.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, 61.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, 65-66.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, 69.

<sup>31</sup> Elton L. Daniel, *The Political and Social History of Khurasan Under Abbasid Rule 747-820* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1979), 146.

<sup>32</sup> Patricia Crone, *The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 138-139.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, 121.

devotion to a messianic figure in Sogdia, and it is probably safe to assume that al-Muqanna presented himself as this figure.<sup>35</sup> In general, his religious program was remarkably syncretic, bringing together “Western, Buddhist, Sufi, and other” doctrines into a single message.<sup>36</sup>

The sheer length of both revolts suggests that they each commanded some form of loyalty from the common people, who would have most likely worked against them and crippled them otherwise. Atabaki says as much about Babak, but since al-Muqanna’s revolt was the second longest-lasting after his, it seems fair to apply a similar thought process to him as well.<sup>37</sup>

### Part 3: Reasons for Revolt

Babak and al-Muqanna essentially shared the same targets. They both viewed Arab, Muslim colonists as the source of their problems. The targets of both these movements were “Arabs” not always in the ethnic sense but in a different, political sense. In the same way that the Hashemite, Khurasani revolutionaries saw an Arab as “a bigoted member of the Umayyad establishment who ascribed religious to his descent,” Babak and al-Muqanna seem to have understood Arabs as Muslims who spoke Arabic and saw themselves as participants in the new, Abbasid establishment.<sup>38</sup> Tellingly, both began their revolts with the murder of Arabs. Babak’s revolt began with the massacre of Yemeni Arabs on the estates of the Rawwad family.<sup>39</sup> Similarly, al-Muqanna’s began with the murder of an Arab noble in the village of Subakh.<sup>40</sup> Both leaders, and their followers, seem deeply concerned with the removal of the ruling, Arabized class of nobility from their lands.

Both also spoke of the drastic change that would come about due to their revolutions, but they formulated these changes along different lines. Babak predicted “a drastic change to be inaugurated by himself in his role of avenger: the mighty would be laid low and the humble exalted. Differently put, the foreigners would be expelled: this was what galvanised [sic] his followers.”<sup>41</sup> To al-Muqanna and his supporters, however, the removal of the ruling class was not the goal in of itself, but would lead to “the inauguration of paradise on earth” which to them, “required the destruction of the caliphal regime in Sogdia and the elimination of its supporters, meaning the local Muslims.”<sup>42</sup> In general, Babak’s declaration appears more clearly social and political, whereas al-Muqanna saw these changes only as the first step towards larger, religious changes.

### Part 4: Goals

Babak’s religious and personal goals appear to have assisted him in achieving a more personal goal: the establishment of himself as local nobility. He claimed that he would “seize the earth, kill the tyrants and restore the religion of Mazdak; he who had been humbled shall be honoured and the humble shall become great.”<sup>43</sup> The “religion of Mazdak” most likely just means Khurramism, as Babak and his followers did not display any real Mazdakite convictions.<sup>44</sup> Generally, this program seems mostly social, in its concept of the uplift of the rural poor and humble. He did not, however, seem to want to create a new polity to truly rival the caliphate. Though he had relative freedom to act for most of his rebellion, he did not attempt either to build new political structures within Azerbaijan or attempt

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<sup>35</sup> *Ibid*, 126.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, 135.

<sup>37</sup> Touraj Atabaki, “Iranian History in Transition: Recasting the Symbolic Identity of Babak Khorramdin,” in *Iran Facing Others* ed. Abbas Amanat and Farzin Vejdani (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 65.

<sup>38</sup> Patricia Crone, *The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 74-75.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, 61.

<sup>40</sup> Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Jafar Narshakhi, *The History of Bukhara*, trans. Richard N. Frye (Cambridge: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1954), 67.

<sup>41</sup> Patricia Crone, *The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 74.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid*, 135.

<sup>43</sup> B. S. Amoretti, “Sects and Heresies,” in *The Cambridge History of Iran* ed. by R. N. Frye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 506.

<sup>44</sup> Patricia Crone, *The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 72.

any conquests outside of it.<sup>45</sup> He developed no administrative structure and made no systematic attempt hold territory, implying that he and his forces relied entirely on plunder rather than taxes and took no control over pre-existing systems of justice.<sup>46</sup> According to some accounts, Babak's true goal was to establish himself as a local, Iranian aristocrat and live his life as a noble. He quickly took up a noble's lifestyle, "hunting with falcons and accumulating women when he was not conducting war."<sup>47</sup> When offered *aman* by the caliphate, he retorted that "one day as king is better than forty years as an abject slave," and later hoped, "wherever I am or wherever I am spoken of, it will be as king."<sup>48</sup> Even after he was captured, he took a last meal of "*faludhaj*, a sweet dish much liked by the Persian emperors, and wine."<sup>49</sup> Generally, he appears to have "embraced the world-view of the Iranian nobility: one lived for power and heroic deeds, ostentatious consumption of wine, women and song, and immortality in the renown one left behind."<sup>50</sup> Generally, he wished to be like the Armenian princes, Arab warlords, and Iranian nobles who represented the "pinnacle of the social world in which he had grown up...just bigger and better."<sup>51</sup> As a man who grew up in a political climate in which strength was the only accepted form of political power, with nothing much to offer to his allies, it makes sense that he would have forgone more traditional methods of legitimizing himself as a noble in favor of sheer power and the threat of attack.

Al-Muqanna's goals appear to stem mostly from his own theology. Like Babak, his message was inherently anti-Islamic, but unlike Babak he may have cast his followers as the "true Muslims."<sup>52</sup> He also concerned himself mostly with his local region of Sogdia, though his grandiose language suggests he may have eventually wished to spread his movement outside of it.<sup>53</sup> If he drew upon the Hashemite tradition which he took part in, he may have wished to build his movement there and then, in a similar fashion, sweep out and establish his own new, utopian society. However, he had no true social program, and was simply political, meaning to rid "Sogdia of the regime of which he and his followers saw themselves as victims."<sup>54</sup> This policy is in stark contrast with Babak's uplift of the humble and laying low of the mighty.

#### Part 5: Ideologies

In presenting their religious and political ideologies, Babak and al-Muqanna, both operating as revolutionary religious leaders, shared a number of ideological tenets. As should be expected from rebels against Muslim rule, both promoted an inherently violent, anti-Muslim program which cast the movements enemies as free targets, unbelievers who could be killed at will, their property taken as spoils of the righteous warriors. Religiously, both made use of *hulul*, or divine indwelling, in which the spirit of a god or prophet reincarnates or otherwise passes into a mortal body. Babak claimed that Javidhan's spirit move into him and al-Muqanna placed himself in a long line of prophets in which god's spirit rested, starting with Adam and ending with himself. This choice on the part of both leaders shows that they inherited religious traditions that valued this concept, despite their geographic separation. In a similar fashion, both promised their own version of an Edenic existence that would come about after their victory. Babak, in a vaguely Christ-like fashion, proclaimed the high would be made low and the low made high, though in his particular case this could be understood along religious and ethnic lines rather than as class distinctions, as the "high" were Muslim "Arabs," no matter their class. Al-Muqanna more clearly promises a religious paradise, on the other hand, claiming, "He who follows me will go to paradise, but he who does not accept me will go to hell."<sup>55</sup> The difference between how the two leaders presented this Eden, however, and their religious programs in general represented one of the larger differences between the two leaders.

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<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, 65.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid*, 66.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, 72.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid*, 74.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid*, 135.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid*, 136.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid*, 137.

<sup>55</sup> Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Jafar Narshakhi, *The History of Bukhara*, trans. Richard N. Frye (Cambridge: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1954), 66.

Though Babak used religion to rise to power, his presentation and goals suggest that his ideology, and that of his followers, was more rooted in political and social concerns. His life as an Iranian aristocrat after coming to power, a lifestyle that many Khurrami would have found sacrilegious due to their aversion to killing and eating meat, suggest he cared more for increasing his own social status than the religious trappings of his position.<sup>56</sup> Even his religious message, mentioned in the last paragraph, appears distinctly more political and social than al-Muqanna's, promising a reversal of earthly fortunes rather than a guarantee of spiritual salvation. Al-Muqanna, on the other hand, presented himself primarily as a divine entity or prophet in which the spirit of god dwelled, not a secular ruler. The structures of their organizations also reflect this difference, as Babak focused almost entirely on the development of his army, drawing from a Khurrami cult society that he does not seem to have developed beyond simply expanding it, whereas al-Muqanna made use of missionaries and generally appears to have structured his own movement after that of the Hashemites, which fused religious and political concerns. The distinction may have developed due to the fact that al-Muqanna placed himself in association with the Turkish khagan, who came to fill the role of "the righteous king who would welcome [the Maitreya Buddha, who al-Muqanna sometimes cast himself as]."<sup>57</sup> Babak, on the other hand, filled the role of both religious and political leader, and seems to have preferred acting as the latter.

The two both make use of Abu Muslim, but the method in which they do so shows a large difference in his importance in their religious vocabulary. Though Crone casts doubt on whether al-Muqanna saw Abu Muslim as one of the members of his prophetic chain, as that would make him the 8<sup>th</sup> rather than the 7<sup>th</sup> Mahdi, he definitely considered Abu Muslim an important religious leader. Babak claims descent from Abu Muslim, apparently, but this claim is rarely mentioned in sources that speak of him, so it must not have been particularly important to his presentation. This ideological difference can be attested to the fact that al-Muqanna operated in the same region as Abu Muslim as well as his relative temporal proximity. Babak's revolt began around 38 years after al-Muqanna's ended and occurred on essentially the opposite side of the Iran, in Azerbaijan, where Abu Muslim never operated, meaning his religious and political importance was probably much less important than it was in al-Muqanna's Khurasan.

The two leaders also used charged language to describe their own role in the world, reflecting their ideologies and their religious, political, and social convictions. Babak cast himself as an "avenger" who would right wrongs and turn the world upon its head, whereas al-Muqanna clearly presented himself as a god made manifest on the earth. Babak's acceptance of the Iranian noble lifestyle, especially as he was born a peasant, appears may connect with the concept of bringing up the lower classes. One can possibly assume that others high in his organization may have also begun presenting themselves in such a fashion, though with less bombast than their leader. Al-Muqanna, on the other hand, spoke of a new revelation and the promise of spiritual paradise in a vaguely apocalyptic sense. His revolution seems primarily religious, not social, and he presented himself as a religious leader with divine qualities rather than a secular nobleman. The differences in these presentations and goals appear to suggest that Azerbaijan's unrest was more of the social and political variety, often centering on issues of class, status, and prestige, whereas in Khurasan the frictions were more religious due to the disbanding of Abu Muslim's army.

## Conclusion

Babak and al-Muqanna both represent outgrowths a palpable, region dissent and dissatisfaction with the newly-enthroned Abbasid caliphate, but they expressed very different forms of this dissent. Al-Muqanna, operating in the heartland of the Hashemite revolution, drew upon the religious fervor whipped up by missionaries in the years leading up to the revolution, especially as many of those caught up in the fervor felt as though they were betrayed because the Abbasids took power themselves instead of giving it to a member of 'Ali's family and the assassination of Abu Muslim. Babak, on the other hand, galvanized an already-existing class struggle in Azerbaijan between the new Arab magnates and a collection of now-disenfranchised Iranian elites and landless peasants into a social, political, and religious movement that sought to drive Muslims from his land entirely. These differences originate from the particular conditions that already existed in the two regions. Azerbaijan, disconnected from the religious fervor of the Hashemite movement, instead endured the general collapse of rural order due to the changing status of the nobility, the influx of semi-military mercenaries and brigands, and the consolidation of land rights into the hands of powerful magnates. Khurasan, as I mentioned, struggled with the fact that its people felt alienated by the Abbasids after they came to power and that one of their religious and political heroes, Abu Muslim, met his end on the caliph's orders. As

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<sup>56</sup> Patricia Crone, *The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 22.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid*, 138.

such, the difference in religious, political, and social dimensions amongst the two revolutionaries also serves to describe the anxieties most pressing to the people of the region in which they rebelled.

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## Los Palestinos: The Impact of Arab Chileans in 20th Century Chile

By David O'Donoghue

Over the course of the 20th century, the Arab Chilean community went from virtually non-existent to one of the largest, most influential, and most socially distinct minority groups in Chile. Numbering in the hundreds of thousands, Arab Chileans have secured a presence at all levels of Chilean society and many have come to wield substantial social and political influence throughout those levels. From fútbol players to factory owners, Arab Chileans have influenced elections, regulations, and even social movements. Through the institutions they built and supported as well as the careers and cultures they maintained, Arab immigrants in Chile have had a tangible impact on the social and political culture of Chile during the mid-20th century.

There are many English language sources about Chilean history, and many were used during the writing of this paper. In almost all of these sources however, there is little study of Arab Chileans as an independent group. The prevailing historiography regarding Arab Chileans in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century seems to focus on their rapid integration into Chilean society, despite the fact they were immigrants. Even Peter Winn's *Weavers of Revolution*, which focuses on Arab immigrant Juan Yarur Lolas' cotton mills and Yarur's rapid rise in influence, gives little attention to his Arab background or his connections with the Arab community. That is not to say such things are not mentioned; Winn acknowledges the existence and prevalence of Arab Chilean periodicals early in his work, while Brenda Elsey's *Citizens & Sportsmen* touches upon the involvement of wealthy Arab immigrants in supporting Chilean fútbol clubs.<sup>1</sup> In short, the background of Arab Chileans is acknowledged, but is considered secondary, even tertiary, in understanding the accomplishments, motivations and orientations of members of that group, which are far more often attributed purely to social status, class, and even geographic location within Chile.

My research paper aims to provide a somewhat new perspective by stressing the independence of the Arab Chileans as a cultural group, despite their many similarities and partial integration with "native" communities, while also emphasizing the often-ignored influence of the Arab Chileans on Chilean media, sports, and business. Very little prior scholarship has focused on the Arab Chilean community itself, which has left a gap in the historiography of both Chile and the Arab diaspora. My paper will attempt to address this oversight. In addition to this larger goal, I aim to bolster support for a view that places greater emphasis on shared Arab immigrant origins as an alternative path towards understanding the political and social mobilization among various Arab Chileans in the 20th century.

### Initial Arab Immigration to Chile

Arab immigration to Chile has occurred since Chilean independence from Spain in 1818. Arab immigration has been present to small degrees since the mid-1800s, but the first major wave of migration came in the early 1900s. Arriving immigrants tended to concentrate in urban centers of Chile, especially the capital, Santiago.<sup>2</sup> Most members of this new wave of immigrants originated from the territories of the Ottoman Empire, mainly from Palestine and Syria, although smaller numbers would also come from Lebanon and other nearby regions.<sup>3</sup>

World War I brought considerable turmoil to these Ottoman controlled territories, especially as Ottoman forces clashed with combined Arab, French, and British forces throughout the Ottoman controlled Levant.<sup>4</sup> Even before the war began, fears of impending conscription inspired an exodus of military aged Arabs from Ottoman territory.<sup>5</sup> The area's governors and officials, wary of potential spies and defectors to the allied forces, also cracked down harshly on Arab communities. Arab Christians in particular were seen as especially likely to defect to the largely

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<sup>1</sup> Peter Winn, *Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 16-17; Brenda Elsey, *Citizens & Sportsmen: Fútbol & Politics in 20th-Century Chile* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), 139.

<sup>2</sup> Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 13-14.

<sup>3</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, "The Ottoman Emigration to America 1860-1914," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17, no. 2 (1985), 175.

<sup>4</sup> Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1997), 175-180.

<sup>5</sup> Elsey, *Citizens and Sportsmen*, 150-152.

Christian British and French forces.<sup>6</sup> Such actions only increased in frequency and intensity as the war neared its conclusion, pushing some Arabs to join the British-backed Arab revolt, but convincing many others to flee the Levant altogether.<sup>7</sup> Even after the war ended, the political instability in the area resulting from the Ottoman Empire's collapse, along with continuing religious and ethnic tensions made emigration an attractive option for many Arabs.<sup>8</sup>

While individual identities within the Arab Chilean group often differed substantially, a shared Christian faith became a dominant characteristic of the new immigrant community. Most Arab Chileans shared an Orthodox Christian faith, with other denominations and faiths existing only as minorities within the larger group during the initial surge of Arab immigration to Chile.<sup>9</sup> This shared minority faith in the Middle East led to the formation of tightly-knit social groups between future Arab Chileans residing in the Ottoman Levant. These groups continued to exist and even expand upon their immigration to Chile.<sup>10</sup> But while their Christian faith made them a minority in the Middle East, it would be their Arab ethnicity and origins that would make them a minority in Chile.

The perception of the Arab immigrants varied amongst Chileans, but they often made generalizations about the immigrant group. The terms "Palestinos" and "Turcos" were often used to refer to the entire Arab immigrant population within Chile, due to both the visibility of certain immigrant groups as well as a legacy of anti-immigrant sentiment.<sup>11</sup> The Arab-immigrant founded and backed Club Deportivo Palestino fútbol club likely played a role in popularizing "Palestino" as a catch all term for Arab Chileans among working class Chileans, mainly due to the team's rapid rise in popularity throughout the twentieth century among both Arab and native-born Chileans.<sup>12</sup> Despite the Club's generally positive reception, initial anti-immigrant sentiment in the early 20th century also played a role in the stereotyping of the Arab community as "los Palestinos."

The first major wave of Arab immigration came in the early 1920s from the territories of the collapsing Ottoman Empire.<sup>13</sup> Government incentives to attract immigration, mainly targeted towards businessmen and entrepreneurs who could help modernize the Chilean economy, soon began clashing with increasing citizen regarding the stability of Chile's economic system. This uncertainty would explode during the Great Depression and its lingering aftermath.<sup>14</sup> Anger at the perceived failure and even waste of government incentive programs, combined with the geographically distant origins of the Arab immigrants as well as a lack of prior presence or visibility in Chile helped lead to the stereotyping of the Arab Chileans as "Los Palestinos" or "Los Turcos."

#### Arab Chilean Media: Periodicals and Publications

Faced with suspicion and stereotypes, Arab Chileans of all social classes made a conscious effort to integrate into Chilean society. However, they also sought to preserve a degree of autonomy as well, and avoid becoming completely assimilated. An excellent demonstration of how these seemingly contradictory goals were accomplished can be found in the periodicals and publications published by the Arab Chilean community. Magazines like *La Reforma* and periodicals including *El Mundo Árabe* were published throughout the 20th century by the Arab Chilean community, offering alternative sources of entertainment and information than more 'indigenous' publications.<sup>15</sup> Topics discussed included national news, reporting on sports clubs and events, film reviews, and even immigrant

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<sup>6</sup> Hasan, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 192-95.

<sup>7</sup> Hasan, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 196-98.

<sup>8</sup> Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 13-15.

<sup>9</sup> Ignacio Klich and Jeffrey Lesser, *Arab and Jewish Immigrants in Latin America: Images and Realities* (London, Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1998), 13-14.

<sup>10</sup> Elsey, *Citizens and Sportsmen*, 154-155.

<sup>11</sup> Elsey, *Citizens and Sportsmen*, 149-150; Roberto Sárach, *Los Turcos* (Santiago, Editorio del Pacifico, 1961), 26-30.

<sup>12</sup> Jorge Zurob, "Club Deportivo Palestino," *La Reforma*, December 6, 1941, 7.

<http://www.mundoarabe.cl/ediciones/359#pagina&1>; Elsey, *Citizens and Sportsmen*, 151-53.

<sup>13</sup> Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 13-14.

<sup>14</sup> Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 17-20.

<sup>15</sup> Abd al Karim Tomas. "Viejo y Nuevo Racismo," *El Mundo Árabe* December 1, 1969. <http://www.mundoarabe.cl/ediciones/993#pagina&1>.

perspectives on events from the Middle East, the birthplace of many elder Arab Chileans.<sup>16</sup> Through the development of their own sources of news and discourse, the Arab community took a crucial step in maintaining a degree of cultural autonomy from mainstream Chilean society.

The figures and ideologies of the martyred Salvador Allende and the empowered Augusto Pinochet, a committed socialist and authoritarian dictator respectively, loomed large in Chile in the aftermath of Pinochet's 1973 coup. All these events occurred in the midst of Arab Chilean efforts to integrate. Interestingly, the Arab community appears to have been sharply divided along economic class lines in regard to the coup and the politics surrounding it, while coverage of such divisions by Arab sources is almost non-existent. Many impoverished Arab laborers longed for the land and regulation reforms of Allende's government, while large business owners tended to support the new government, which offered financial support and even bailouts to its supporters.<sup>17</sup> Despite such feelings, Arab Chilean periodicals remained largely silent on the issue, rarely discussing Pinochet or his predecessor in the months following the coup. In doing so, these publications sought to de-emphasize and hide disagreements within the Arab community, while simultaneously ensuring that the Arab community was not perceived as disloyal to a regime infamous for its forceful, often violent suppression of dissent.<sup>18</sup> In this way, Arab periodicals helped the Arab Chilean community not just to integrate, but to escape government scrutiny and state-sponsored persecution as well.

Even while such publications rose to secure the prominence and security of Arab Chileans as a group, they also served to present a more positive image of the community to native-born Chileans. Perhaps the most immediately apparent component of these efforts was linguistic; the large majority of publications appear to have been written in Spanish, by far the dominant language among the general Chilean population.<sup>19</sup> While writing in Spanish would likely become a subconscious choice for successive generations, this choice of language is present even in early periodicals from the 1920s, when new immigrants had very likely held little experience with the Spanish language. The deliberate use of Spanish heavily implies that Arab Chileans were not the only targeted audience for publications like *La Reforma* or even *El Mundo Arabe*, and that native-born Chileans were also sought as readers. The successes and endeavors of Arab businessmen, sports stars, and organizations would often find coverage in Arab Chilean media, which tended to emphasize the industriousness and entrepreneurship of the Arab communities most successful members.<sup>20</sup> While such coverage may not have convinced every reader of the wild success of the Arab community, the continued presence of such articles in what tended to become long-running publications granted a degree of legitimacy to Arab Chilean presence and participation in Chilean society, while also subtly maintaining a degree of separation between the two. Such coverage would also support the rise of one of the Arab Community's most renowned organizations: the Palestinian Sports Club.

#### Arab Chilean Sports: Club Palestino

Some Arab immigrants would follow a path that led to sports and athletics. Many founded sports clubs for fútbol, tennis, and other popular sports. Club Deportivo Palestino, or the Palestinian Sports Club, was founded by a collection of Arab immigrants in the 1920's to compete against other immigrant fútbol clubs from Spain and Italy.<sup>21</sup> During these early stages, the Club experienced positive reception among the Arab Chilean community, but was railed against by many sports magazines as both anti-Semitic and accused of leeching off public funding and space in order to find success.<sup>22</sup> Such criticism did not abate when the Club entered Chile's first professional fútbol leagues, with criticism being levied at a perceived tendency of the club to bribe officials for better press and more favorable business deals. While teams founded by European immigrants were praised for their ingenuity and skill as Chilean fútbol clubs, the Arabian Club Deportivo Palestino continually struggled to shake off a publicly imposed identity of a foreign,

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<sup>16</sup> Elias Konsol, "Pequeñas Historias Arabes," *El Mundo Arabe* August 15, 1970.

<http://www.mundoarabe.cl/ediciones/1008#pagina&l>.

<sup>17</sup> Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 150-53, 254-56.

<sup>18</sup> Pamela Constable, Arturo Valenzuela, *A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), 141-45.

<sup>19</sup> Rex A. Hudson, *Chile: A Country Study* (Washington D.C.: Federal Research Division Library of Congress, 1994), xxi-xxiii.

<sup>20</sup> Jorge Zurob, "Club Deportivo Palestino", *La Reforma*, December 6, 1941, 7; Elsey, *Citizens and Sportsmen*, 151-53.

<sup>21</sup> Elsey, *Citizens and Sportsmen*, 156-58.

<sup>22</sup> Elsey, *Citizens and Sportsmen*, 156; Zurob, "Club Deportivo Palestino," 7.

almost parasitic actor in an otherwise ‘Chilean’ fútbol league.<sup>23</sup> Despite such controversies, Club Deportivo Palestino’s success on the field, combined with its generous funding by the Arab Community, would allow the Club to attract highly skilled players, players who would eventually grant the Club and the Arab community that had backed it prestige and eventual acceptance as well as financial return for the Club’s owners.<sup>24</sup>

#### Arab Chilean Businessmen: The Entrepreneurs and Yarur

In their new home, other, less athletically inclined Arab Chileans found success in founding and running their own businesses. Most of these entrepreneurs focused on small, local businesses, including general stores, local banks, clothing shops, and other similar enterprises.<sup>25</sup> Hundreds of these small business owners were documented and promoted in directories produced by the Arab Chilean community, describing both the owner as well as the nature and location of their businesses.<sup>26</sup> Such ventures, beyond securing financial stability for their owners, also demonstrated the ability of Arab Chileans to contribute to Chile’s economy and greater society. While racist incidents that targeted the Arab Chilean community continued well through the 1970’s, generally revolving around the use of slurs and occasional vandalism, the creation of Arab institutions within Chile began to legitimize and steadily increase the influence of Arab Chileans as a whole.<sup>27</sup> In seeking to understand just how successful and politically influential these Arab businessmen grew to be, one must only examine one of its most publicly visible and arguably most successful members. Juan Yarur Lolas, founder of the Banco de Crédito e Inversiones and numerous successful cotton mills created a business empire that remains in the hands of his descendants even today.<sup>28</sup>

Over four decades, Juan Yarur Lolas and his family built a business and manufacturing empire that amassed sizeable profits for its owners, its shareholders, and the Chilean national economy overall. Yarur arrived in Chile in 1933 along with his two brothers, having spent a few years in Bolivia overseeing a moderately successful cotton mill.<sup>29</sup> Yarur built his first cotton mill in Santiago soon after his arrival, and quickly built connections with local banks and investors, but maintained his previously established links with Bolivian machine manufacturers.<sup>30</sup> By 1945, the mill operated at maximum capacity, having grown rapidly through the Second World War due to a lack of Japanese competition and Yarur’s own shrewd business acumen.<sup>31</sup> Yarur soon began to buy out local mills and make it increasingly difficult for foreign companies to compete, further strengthening his market position.<sup>32</sup> Hundreds of workers, many of them fellow Arab Chileans, would come under his employ.

Beyond economic success, the example of Yarur is an excellent demonstration of how economic and financial success often developed into an ability to influence and even challenge the Chilean political scene. One notable example began with the institution of new labor laws in the 1950s, which threatened to challenge Yarur’s dominance over the cotton market. When the Chilean minister of labor attempted to force Yarur to abide by these laws however, Yarur’s political pull resulted in the minister’s own coerced resignation, enabling Yarur to, in effect, ignore national law.<sup>33</sup> The Yarur family’s wealth enabled them to generously donate to candidates that secured their approval, allowing the institution of more ‘pro-Yarur’ legislation, while their quickly growing fame and prestige made even unofficial verbal support valuable. An endorsement from Radio Balmaceda, the Yarur family’s radio station, became highly sought by aspiring politicians, while generously funded advertisements for Yarur owned businesses continued to appear in newspapers and periodicals.<sup>34</sup> Yarur quickly became one of the most visible, well-connected, and influential men in Santiago, if not all of Chile.

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<sup>23</sup> Elsey, *Citizens and Sportsmen*, 157-162.

<sup>24</sup> Elsey, *Citizens and Sportsmen*, 149-153.

<sup>25</sup> Elsey, *Citizens and Sportsmen*, 155.

<sup>26</sup> Ahmad Hassan Mattar, *Guía Social de la Colonial Arabe en Chile*, (Santiago: Ahues Hnos, 1941), 250-260.

<sup>27</sup> Tomas, “Viejo y Nuevo Racismo,” 11.

<sup>28</sup> “Luis Enrique Yarur Rey,” *Forbes*, last modified November 12, 2018, <https://www.forbes.com/profile/luis-enrique-yarur-rey/#49285c503ed1>; Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 4-5, 265.

<sup>29</sup> Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 12-16.

<sup>30</sup> Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 18.

<sup>31</sup> Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 20.

<sup>32</sup> Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 20-21.

<sup>33</sup> Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 20.

<sup>34</sup> Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 29-31.

## The Arab Chilean Working Class

Beyond the grand endeavors of the soccer clubs, the entrepreneurs, and the shadow of Yarur lay the more 'everyday' Arab Chileans. This large group was composed of the laborers, salarymen, housekeepers, and recent arrivals who had yet to adjust to Chilean society. Yet despite their comparative lack of wealth or prestige, Arab laborers, workers and small businessmen provided the economic and social support necessary to ensure the overall success of the Arab Chilean community. Arab Chileans worked in Yarur's mills and banks and many became active supporters of Arab Chilean sports clubs, most notably Club Deportivo Palestino.<sup>35</sup> While Yarur and the sports clubs eventually gained the support of the Chilean public and government, they relied on the larger Arab community for publicity, financial support, and even initial funding; Yarur's first factory in Chile relied in part on thousands of dollars from local Arab businessmen just to secure financing.<sup>36</sup> Especially when faced with an often suspicious, even hostile native born public, the backing of the Arab community, through favorable editorials, continual participation, and direct funding, was vital in securing the success of the most prestigious Arab Chilean efforts. Their successes, in turn, reflected well upon not just the most prestigious members of the community, but upon the Arab Chilean community as a whole.<sup>37</sup>

## Conclusion

Through endeavors grand and small, Arab Chileans managed integration without assimilation. The businesses of Yarur, the sports clubs of the 'Palestinians,' and the Arab periodicals along with radio programs carved out their places in Chile's modern culture, while remaining distinctly 'Arab' in their own unique fashions. Club Deportivo Palestino still bears the red, green, black, and white colors of the Syrian and Palestinian flags, Yarur's empire remains split among his descendants, and *El Mundo Arabe* has maintained a focus on Palestinian, Syrian, and Arab Chilean affairs well into the 21st century.<sup>38</sup> The survival and success of these institutions into the modern day serve as the most visible, but far from the only, monuments to the legacy of the Arab Chilean immigrants of the 20th century.

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<sup>35</sup> Elsey, *Citizens and Sportsmen*, 149-153; Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 34-36.

<sup>36</sup> Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 17.

<sup>37</sup> Elsey, *Citizens and Sportsmen*, 160-65.

<sup>38</sup> Forbes, "Luis Enrique Yarur Rey"; Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 4-5, 265; Ricardo Urzúa Munita "Al Fatah y Hamas forman gobierno de unidad" *El Mundo Arabe* June 30, 2014, 3.  
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# The Imperial Mosques of Istanbul: The Construction of Ottoman Legitimacy

Adam Fairchild

## Introduction

Throughout the histories of the Byzantine and Ottoman empires, the city of Constantinople, later known by the Ottomans as “Istanbul” was central to imperial governance.<sup>1</sup> As Istanbul served as the seat of power for both empires, the city proved essential in the construction of imperial legitimacy. In both empires, patronage for the construction of religious sites in Istanbul was integral to imperial legitimacy. In Byzantine Constantinople, imperial patronage for religious architecture like the Hagia Sophia posited the emperor as a defender of Christendom and created divine support for imperial rule. Ottoman imperial legitimation within Istanbul occurred primarily through patronage for mosques. Within scholarship of the imperial mosques of Ottoman Istanbul, questions exist about the intended audiences of imperial mosques’ legitimation efforts. In my paper, I argue that over the first 150 years of Ottoman rule in Istanbul, imperial mosques increasingly asserted imperial legitimacy beyond Istanbul. While earlier imperial mosques established Ottoman legitimacy within Istanbul through appropriation of Christian sites of memory, innovations in art and architecture, and imitation of the Hagia Sophia, later mosques advanced legitimacy beyond Istanbul through displays of the Sultan’s piety.

My scholarship considerably incorporates the study of “sites of memory,” first analyzed by Pierre Nora in *Les Lieux de Mémoire*.<sup>2</sup> Nora defines sites of memory as the “...ultimate embodiments of a commemorative consciousness that survives a historical consciousness which, having renounced memory, cries out for it.”<sup>3</sup> Sites of memory include places, sites, and causes that carry material, functional and symbolic meanings.<sup>4</sup> Drawing on the scholarship of Nora, I argue that within newly-conquered Istanbul, sites like the Hagia Sophia and the Church of the Holy Apostles were sites of memory for the Byzantine empire among residents of the city. One common historiographical approach to the study of Istanbul are long-scale histories of the city itself, notably Hughes’ *Istanbul: A Tale of Three Cities*. In consideration of Ottoman art and architecture, most scholarship focuses on developments in art and architecture that occurred during the Ottoman empire. Exemplified by Michael Levey’s *Ottoman Art and Architecture*, these texts focus more on developments of Ottoman art and architecture than their roles within imperial legitimacy. My paper deviates from these historiographical patterns as I place the developments in the art and architecture of imperial mosques within imperial legitimation.

My paper begins with an analysis of the conquest and Islamisation of Istanbul. In this section, I describe the Byzantine context of imperial patronage for the construction of religious sites for imperial legitimation. This section discusses the Ottoman conversion of the Hagia Sophia, the “Church of the Christians” of Byzantine Constantinople into a Muslim mosque.<sup>5</sup> I establish Ottoman governance of the city through assertions of religious identity and legitimacy over Byzantine religious sites. I continue my paper with an examination of Ottoman imperial legitimation efforts through the construction of three imperial mosque complexes within the first 150 years of Ottoman governance of Istanbul: the Fatih Mosque of Mehmet II, the Suleymaniye Mosque complex of Suleiman I, and the Blue Mosque

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<sup>1</sup> After the conquest of Byzantine Constantinople, its new Muslim inhabitants began to refer to the city as “Islam-bol,” which translates from Arabic as “Islam Abounds.” There exists scholarly debate over the etymological origins of the “Istanbul,” as some argue that “Istanbul” is a Turkish adoption of the Greek “eis ten polin” – “into the city.” In my paper, I use “Istanbul” in my introduction when referring to the city in a general sense, as it is the city’s current name. I refer to the city as “Constantinople” when referring to the city under Byzantine rule (395-1453 CE) and “Istanbul” when discussing Ottoman rule of the city (1453-1918) in my essay. This distinction defers to how sources refer to the city, which occasionally are anachronistic. I make no promises that every reference to the city is the most chronologically-appropriate; however, I do everything possible to ensure that they are in accordance with my sources and their temporal contexts. For a more-lengthy study of the various names for Istanbul throughout history, see Hughes’ *Istanbul: A Tale of Three Cities*, xxvii-xxix.

<sup>2</sup> In English, “Les Lieux de Mémoire” translates to “The Places of Memory.”

<sup>3</sup> Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History,” in *Realms of History: Rethinking the French Past*, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Columbia Press, 1996), 6.

<sup>4</sup> Nora, “Between Memory and History,” 14.

<sup>5</sup> Procopius, *The Buildings*, transl. H.E.B. Dewing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), 11.

of Sultan Ahmed I. I track how these mosques evolve to represent imperial piety within Islam as a form of personal legitimation instead of asserting Ottoman imperial legitimacy over Istanbul. Through my discussion of the three imperial mosques, I argue that the legitimation efforts of imperial mosque construction shifts in focus from Istanbul to the larger Islamic world.

### The Hagia Sophia and the Islamisation of Istanbul

Since its establishment as a Byzantine Christian temple, the Hagia Sophia has remained an essential component to the visual landscape of Istanbul. In Greek, “Hagia Sophia” means “the Church of the Divine Wisdom.”<sup>6</sup> The Hagia Sophia was constructed following the Nika Insurrection during the reign of Emperor Justinian I, which presented a serious threat to imperial governance of Constantinople. During this insurrection, fires destroyed much of Constantinople including the church at the site of the Hagia Sophia. Byzantine court historian Procopius describes how in the aftermath of the Nika Insurrection, Justinian I gathered the best artisans of the world to construct a new temple. Procopius writes how these artisans reflected “the honour in which God held the Emperor” and that the newly-constructed Hagia Sophia emerged as “a spectacle of marvelous beauty.”<sup>7</sup> Procopius details the architectural advances of the Hagia Sophia, including its sheer size and its enormous golden dome that appeared to be “suspended from heaven.”<sup>8</sup> In *The Buildings*, Procopius’ awe-filled description of the Hagia Sophia establishes divine favor for Justinian I and the Byzantine empire. The panegyric nature of Procopius’ *The Buildings* indicates its usage in imperial legitimation efforts to proclaim divine favor for the Emperor to citizens of Constantinople and throughout the Byzantine empire.<sup>9</sup> The objectivity of the Procopius’ description of the Hagia Sophia remains questionable due to the role of imperial patronage in support for Procopius. Despite these questions, *The Buildings* reveals the relationship between imperial patronage for religious architecture and cultivation of political legitimacy among Christians in Constantinople.

Throughout the centuries following its construction, the Hagia Sophia was integral to the public life and religious expression of the Byzantine empire. On major holidays, great processions of the patriarchate and the emperor began at the Hagia Sophia, processed to major sites of imperial power like the Forum of Constantine, and then returned to the Hagia Sophia.<sup>10</sup> While at the Hagia Sophia, these processions incorporated rituals observed by both the patriarch and the emperor. As described in Lethaby’s *Sancta Sophia*, an essential component of major processions throughout Constantinople involved the kissing of “the Sacred Wood,” a relic believed to be a piece of Christ’s cross.<sup>11</sup> This observance demonstrated imperial reverence for relics contained within the Hagia Sophia. Along with these processions, the display of imperial crowns over the altar of the Hagia Sophia further reinforced the image of a unified Byzantine church and state.<sup>12</sup> Exemplified in patronage for the Hagia Sophia, religious architecture was essential in legitimizing Byzantine rule in Constantinople. Despite the religious differences between Byzantine Christianity and Ottoman Islam, the importance of religious architecture to imperial legitimacy remained a continuity during the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul.

The Ottoman empire first emerged near the end of the 13<sup>th</sup> century. They began as one of several semi-nomadic Turkish tribes and did not begin expansion efforts from their capital of Bursa until 1280 CE.<sup>13</sup> By the middle of the 14<sup>th</sup> century, the growth of the Ottoman empire presented an immense threat to the Byzantine empire and its control over Constantinople. Despite efforts at reconciliation between the two empires, the Ottoman empire continued to expand through the conquest of Byzantine cities across Anatolia throughout the 14<sup>th</sup> and early 15<sup>th</sup> centuries.<sup>14</sup> Led

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<sup>6</sup> Mary Wortley Montagu, “Hagia Sophia, the Church of the Divine Wisdom,” In *Istanbul Anthology: Travel Writings Across the Centuries*, ed. Kaya Genç (Cairo: The American University at Cairo Press, 2015), 65.

<sup>7</sup> Procopius, *The Buildings*, 13.

<sup>8</sup> Procopius, *The Buildings*, 21.

<sup>9</sup> Glanville Downey, “The Composition of Procopius, De Aedificiis,” *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 78 (1947): 171.

<sup>10</sup> Albrecht Berger, “Imperial and Ecclesiastical Processions in Constantinople,” in *Byzantine Constantinople: Monuments, Topography, and Everyday Life*, ed. Nevra Necipoğlu (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2001), 75.

<sup>11</sup> W.R. Lethaby, *The Church of Sancta Sophia: a study of Byzantine building* (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1894), 94.

<sup>12</sup> Lethaby, *The Church of Sancta Sophia: a study of Byzantine building*, 73.

<sup>13</sup> Bettany Hughes, *Istanbul: A Tale of Three Cities* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2017), 378.

<sup>14</sup> Bettany Hughes, *Istanbul: A Tale of Three Cities*, 380.



by Sultan Mehmet II, nicknamed “the Conqueror,” the Ottoman empire conquered Constantinople on 29 May 1453 and dealt the fatal blow to the remaining pockets of the Byzantine empire.

During and immediately after the conquest of Constantinople, Ottoman expressions of imperial legitimacy through religious architecture were essential in justifying Ottoman rule over the city. One important development in religious architecture following the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople was the al-Eyub mosque. Described as “Istanbul’s holiest shrine,” the al-Eyub mosque was founded at the burial site of al-Eyub, a companion of the Prophet. Within popular legend, al-Eyub led an Islamic effort to conquer Constantinople in the 7<sup>th</sup> century yet was defeated and martyred.<sup>15</sup> During the conquest of Constantinople, Mehmet II devoted considerable time in search of the burial site of al-Eyub, and after finding it constructed a mosque at the site. This mosque complex marked the first Ottoman imperial mosque constructed within the newly-conquered Istanbul.<sup>16</sup> Imperial patronage for the al-Eyub mosque directly posited the Ottoman invading army within the historical context of Islamic expansion and conquests. As the Ottoman empire first conquered Constantinople for Islam, the connection to the martyrdom of al-Eyub established Ottoman supremacy within the world of Islam. The establishment of the al-Eyub mosque further legitimized Ottoman governance within Constantinople as it marked the victory of Islam over Byzantine Christianity.

Mehmet II further asserted legitimacy in Ottoman governance over Istanbul through the conversion of the Hagia Sophia from a Christian temple into a mosque. During the siege of Constantinople, the Hagia Sophia was an epicenter of Byzantine and Ottoman armed conflict within the city. As the Ottoman army conquered the city, the Hagia Sophia became “deluged with the blood of the idolaters...”<sup>17</sup> As described by Kritovoulos, a 15<sup>th</sup> century Greek historian who authored an account of the siege of Constantinople, those found in the Hagia Sophia were killed or taken captive.<sup>18</sup> Despite the violence that occurred within the temple of the Hagia Sophia, its religious significance to Byzantine Christians did not go unnoticed by Ottoman invaders. One of the best primary sources available to historians is Evliya Çebeli’s *Narrative of Travels*. Despite conflicting opinions surrounding Çebeli’s precision in descriptions of Ottoman architecture, his *Narrative of Travels* is widely considered an immensely valuable source within studies of Ottoman society, politics, and culture.<sup>19</sup> Evliya Çebeli describes the deliberate conversion of the Hagia Sophia into an Ottoman Mosque, claiming that:

Sultan Mohamed II, on surveying the church of the Ayá Sófyah, was astonished at the solidity of its construction, the strength of its foundations, the height of its cupola, and the skill of its builder, Agnádús. He caused this ancient place of worship to be cleared of its idolatrous impurities and purified from the blood of the slain, and having refreshed the brain of the victorious Moslems... converted it in that very hour into a jámi (a cathedral) ...that might rival Paradise. On the following Friday, the faithful were summoned to prayer by the muezzins, who proclaimed with a loud voice this text: “Verily, God and his angels bless the Prophet.”<sup>20</sup>

Mehmet II’s conversion of the Hagia Sophia into an Ottoman mosque exemplifies the Ottoman appropriation of Byzantine religious architecture as a tool of imperial legitimation. The Ottoman conversion of the Hagia Sophia proved essential throughout the conquest of Istanbul as this site epitomized the claims to religious legitimacy of the Byzantine empire. During the conquest of Constantinople, the battle in the Hagia Sophia and its ensuing conversion ultimately represented the triumph of Islam over Christendom. The conversion of the Hagia Sophia signified the transfer of divine favor from the Byzantine empire to the Ottoman empire. Throughout the conquest and Islamisation of Istanbul, Ottoman appropriation of Byzantine religious architecture was integral in assertions of religious legitimacy of Ottoman governance in the city.

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<sup>15</sup> Evliya Çebeli, *Narrative of Travels in Europe, Africa, and Asia in the Seventeenth Century*, transl. Ritter Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall (London: Parbury, Allen & Co., 1834), 23.

<sup>16</sup> Will Seymour Monroe, “The Mosque of Eyub,” in *Istanbul Anthology: Travel Writing through the Centuries*, ed. Kaya Genç (Cairo: The American University at Cairo, 2015), 70.

<sup>17</sup> Evliya Çebeli, *Narrative of Travels*, 44.

<sup>18</sup> Kritovoulos, *The History of Mehmet the Conqueror*, trans. Charles T. Riggs (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1954), 75-76.

<sup>19</sup> Klaus Kreiser, “Evliya Çebeli,” University of Chicago: Division of the Humanities, pub. October 2005, <https://ottomanhistorians.uchicago.edu/en/historian/evliya-celebi>.

<sup>20</sup> Evliya Çebeli, *Narrative of Travels*, 45.

## Ottoman Imperial Legitimation, 1463-1609 Ce

Imperial mosques of Istanbul were essential in the construction of imperial legitimacy within the Ottoman empire. While each of these mosques demonstrated imperial power, their intended audience evolved throughout the first 150 years of Ottoman governance over Istanbul. Evidenced in the Fatih mosque of Mehmet II, earlier Ottoman imperial mosques established legitimacy within Istanbul through appropriation of Christian sites of memory within Istanbul, evolutions in art and architecture and imitation of the Hagia Sophia. However, later imperial mosques deliberately sought to inspire imperial legitimacy throughout the Islamic world through their portrayals of the personal piety of the sultanate.

### Mehmet II and the Fatih Mosque

The construction of the Fatih mosque complex in 1463 CE marks a critical point of Ottoman imperial legitimacy in religious architecture. As the imperial mosque of first Sultan of Istanbul, the Fatih mosque complex represented the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. In Turkish, “fatih” directly translates into “the conqueror.”<sup>21</sup> Not only was Mehmet II increasingly referred to as “Mehmet Fatih,” but his imperial mosque became a physical representation of his conquest of Istanbul. Construction of the Fatih mosque began in 1463 at the site of Justinian’s Church of the Holy Apostles. While it had been considered “ruined” since the 13<sup>th</sup> century by Christian residents of Constantinople,<sup>22</sup> the Church of the Holy Apostles carried immense significance as it served as an imperial mausoleum for Byzantine emperors dating back to Constantine.<sup>23</sup> As the primary mausoleum for Byzantine emperors, the Church of the Holy Apostles was an essential site of memory for Byzantine rule within Istanbul. The construction of the Faith mosque directly atop of the Byzantine church signifies an attempt to appropriate Byzantine architecture and to connect Ottoman governance to the city’s foundations. The conquest of the Church of the Holy Apostles represents the erasure of Byzantine sites of memory throughout Istanbul. In the conquest and erasure of Byzantine sites of memory, Mehmet II advanced Ottoman legitimacy within Istanbul.

The Fatih Mosque further legitimated the rule of Mehmet II through its usage of art and architecture. One important feature of the Fatih mosque is its usage of inscriptions to convey spiritual legitimacy. In the Fatih mosque, an inscription directly next to the main entrance reads “They will conquer Konstantiniya. Hail to the prince and the army to whom this is given.”<sup>24</sup> While its authenticity is doubtful, this inscription is attributed to a saying of Prophet, recorded in the Koran.<sup>25</sup> This inscription supports Ottoman claims of divine support for the sultanate, which bestows a powerful sense of spiritual legitimacy upon the rule of Mehmet II. Along with these inscriptions, the enormity of the Fatih mosque communicated a connection with the divine. Despite being smaller than the Hagia Sophia, the Fatih mosque had the largest dome constructed by that point among Ottoman mosques and represented an “imposing massiveness...” that characterized the architectural style of Mehmet II.<sup>26</sup> The size and scale of the Fatih mosque demonstrates the role of architecture in inspiring devotion to the Ottoman sultanate as the new rulers of Istanbul. The inscriptions and architectural evolutions in the Fatih mosque exemplify the usage of imperial mosques in the construction of Ottoman legitimacy within Istanbul.

The Fatih Mosque advanced imperial legitimacy among residents of Istanbul through its imitation of the Hagia Sophia. Despite the conversion of the Hagia Sophia from a church to a mosque, the Hagia Sophia remained a

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<sup>21</sup> Michael Levey, *The World of Ottoman Art* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975), 41.

<sup>22</sup> During the 4<sup>th</sup> Crusade (1202-1204 CE), Western European crusaders plundered Constantinople after tensions between Western European Christendom and the Byzantine empire grew to open conflict. In this plundering, Justinian’s Church of the Holy Apostles suffered considerable damage and was never fully restored after the Crusaders left the city. For a greater analysis of the Fourth Crusade and the plundering of Constantinople, see W.B. Bartlett’s *An Ungodly War: The Sack of Constantinople and the Fourth Crusade*.

<sup>23</sup> Glanville Downey, “The Tombs of the Byzantine Emperors at the Church of the Holy Apostles in Constantinople,” *Journal of Hellenistic Studies* 79 (1959): 27.

<sup>24</sup> “Inscriptive plaque,” Fatih Camii, *Archnet*, accessed 5 December 2019, [https://archnet.org/sites/1982/media\\_contents/7672](https://archnet.org/sites/1982/media_contents/7672)

<sup>25</sup> Franz Babinger, “The transition from Byzantine to Ottoman art – the Mosque of the Conqueror,” in *Istanbul: A Traveller’s Companion*, ed. Laurence Kelly (London: Constable & Co., 1987), 177.

<sup>26</sup> Levey, *The World of Ottoman Art*, 48.

reminder of past Byzantine rule over Istanbul. In the Fatih mosque, Mehmet II directly imitated the architectural style of the Hagia Sophia. Like the Hagia Sophia, the Fatih mosque incorporated numerous arches and columns to support an enormous central dome at the top of the building.<sup>27</sup> These architectural features imitated the architectural style of the Hagia Sophia, which also used arches and columns to support an immense central dome. The Fatih mosque further imitated the Hagia Sophia through its usage of light. In the Fatih mosque, superimposed windows enabled the passing of “unobscured light” throughout the interior of the mosque.<sup>28</sup> The importance of natural light in the Fatih mosque drew inspiration from the lamps and windows of the Hagia Sophia that “show[s] the way to the living God.”<sup>29</sup> The connections between the Fatih mosque and the Hagia Sophia are frequently mentioned in surveys of Byzantine and Ottoman architecture, with author Franz Babinger claiming that “the imitation of the Hagia Sophia is obvious.”<sup>30</sup> The imitation of the Hagia Sophia in the Fatih Mosque was essential in advancing Ottoman legitimacy in Istanbul. The construction of the Fatih mosque represents continued patronage for architecture in imperial legitimation between the Byzantine and Ottoman empires. Through its usage of light and imitation of the Hagia Sophia, the Fatih mosque established Ottoman authority within Istanbul. Beyond the imitation of the Hagia Sophia, the Fatih Mosque’s assertion of a distinct Ottoman authority in Istanbul remained present throughout imperial patronage for mosques within successive Sultanates.

### Suleiman I and the Suleymaniye Mosque Complex

After assuming rule of the Ottoman empire in 1520, Suleiman I continued in the imperial expansion efforts of earlier Sultans. Throughout the 1520s, he led numerous military raids throughout central Europe and conquered Belgrade along with islands like Rhodes in 1522. These successive conquests won Suleiman the title “Kanuni Suleiman” among the Ottoman populace, which meant “the Lawgiver.”<sup>31</sup> Suleiman I led imperial expansion efforts until the Ottoman defeat to the Hapsburgs at the siege of Vienna in 1529.<sup>32</sup> Following this defeat, Suleiman patronized naval expansion under privateer Hayreddin Pasha, remembered by his nickname “Barbarossa.”<sup>33</sup> While Barbarossa inspired fear within the Italian peninsula due to his raids of Sicily and Capri in 1535-1534, Suleiman I turned his attention to architectural pursuits in Istanbul.<sup>34</sup> During the reign of Suleiman, imperial architectural patronage included the construction of sites of imperial power throughout Istanbul under the supervision of chief imperial architect Sinan. Sinan, born a slave, rose in societal status through military prowess under the rule of Suleiman.<sup>35</sup> As described in one of his autobiographies, Sinan constructed various edifices and minor mosques for Suleiman before 1550. Following the successes of these projects, Sinan’s life changed in 1550 when he received instructions to construct “for him [Suleiman I] a beautiful mosque.”<sup>36</sup> This mosque would become the famed Suleymaniye Mosque complex, the architectural embodiment of imperial legitimacy during the reign of Suleiman I.

The Suleymaniye Mosque complex was integral to imperial legitimacy during the reign of Suleiman I. Upon its completion in 1557, the Suleymaniye stood unparalleled in its prominence in the landscape of Istanbul. The Suleymaniye largely continued in the architectural pattern of earlier imperial mosques through its usage of four minarets and a central dome flanked with surrounding domes. In comparison to the other imperial mosques of Istanbul, the Suleymaniye mosque complex is distinct in its sheer enormity. While earlier imperial mosques like the Fatih mosque contained fewer than 50 domes that surrounded the central mosque, the Suleymaniye included over 400 surrounding domes.<sup>37</sup> The Suleymaniye additionally contained “4 madrasas,<sup>38</sup> 1 elementary school, 1 hadith school,

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<sup>27</sup> Levey, *The World of Ottoman Art*, 44.

<sup>28</sup> Babinger, “The transition from Byzantine to Ottoman art,” 177.

<sup>29</sup> Lethaby, *Sancta Sophia: a study of Byzantine Building*, 52.

<sup>30</sup> Babinger, “The transition from Byzantine to Ottoman art,” 177.

<sup>31</sup> Levey, *The World of Ottoman Art*, 65.

<sup>32</sup> Hughes, *Istanbul: A Tale of Three Cities*, 434.

<sup>33</sup> Hughes, 435.

<sup>34</sup> William V. Hudon, “Countering “The Turk”; Papal and Genoese Naval Policy 1535-1536,” *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae* 30 (1992): 353.

<sup>35</sup> Mimar Sinan, *Sinan’s Autobiographies: Five Sixteenth-Century Texts*, ed. Gulru Necipoğlu, trans. Howard Crane and Esra Akin (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2006), 88.

<sup>36</sup> Sinan, *Sinan’s Autobiographies: Five Sixteenth-Century Texts*, 89.

<sup>37</sup> Levey, *The World of Ottoman Art*, 81.

<sup>38</sup> A madrasa is an Islamic theological college that trained Imams and other religious leaders.

1 medical school, and 1 hospital.”<sup>39</sup> Although other imperial mosques contained similar establishments, the Suleymaniye eclipsed the services of other imperial mosques. These establishments serviced residents of Istanbul, which inspired widespread support for Suleiman I and advanced legitimacy for the rule of Suleiman. Sinan describes how “God made Suleiman the protector of every slave. \ He became the protector of rich and poor.”<sup>40</sup> In its establishments like schools and hospitals that served residents in the city, the Suleymaniye represented Suleiman’s religious devotion. The Suleymaniye advanced legitimacy for the rule of Suleiman I through its size and display of imperial piety. However, the Suleymaniye Mosque complex marks a shift within the role of imperial mosques in legitimation as it sought to establish legitimacy both within and beyond Istanbul.

The Suleymaniye mosque complex furthered imperial legitimacy both within Istanbul and throughout the Islamic world. This mosque complex rooted legitimacy for the rule of Suleiman I within Istanbul through its conscious imitation of earlier imperial mosques and the Hagia Sophia. Beyond its shared external features with earlier imperial mosques, the Suleymaniye included internal features similar to other Ottoman mosques, notably its usage of lamps. Lamps were used in earlier imperial mosques and the Hagia Sophia for the practical purpose of illumination, but in “Night of Power in the Mosque of the Sophia,” Arthur Conan Doyle details the deeper connections between lamps and the “fanaticism...in the air” during worship in the mosque.<sup>41</sup> In his description of the Suleymaniye, Evliya Çebeli claims that “the total number of the lamps is 22,000.”<sup>42</sup> Along with lamps, the Suleymaniye contained numerous windows, gardens, and fountains that “revive[d] the congregation; so that they seem to be enjoying eternal life in Paradise.”<sup>43</sup> These features of the Suleymaniye connected the rule of Suleiman I to earlier Ottoman Sultans. In the connection between its gardens, fountains, and windows and Paradise, the Suleymaniye advanced imperial claims of divine support for the rule of Suleiman I. Despite its similar architectural features with earlier imperial mosques, the immensity of the Suleymaniye mosque complex ultimately posited Suleiman I as superior to earlier Sultans and established imperial legitimacy throughout Istanbul.

The Suleymaniye mosque complex furthered imperial legitimacy not just within Istanbul, but throughout the Islamic world. In descriptions of the Suleymaniye, one commonly mentioned architectural feature is its four columns. According to Sinan, “each of those four marble columns...came from a [different] land.”<sup>44</sup> These lands included Arabia, Alexandria, and the island of Marmar. In its usage of marble from regions beyond Istanbul, the Suleymaniye represented the imperial expansion efforts held by Suleiman I. The four columns of the Suleymaniye are further significant within the Islamic world through their appeal to the Four Chosen Friends of the Prophet. Revered among Sunni Muslims, the Four Chosen Friends of the Prophet (Rashidun) refer to the four successive caliphs following the Prophet: Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman, and ‘Ali.<sup>45</sup> In his description of the columns of the Suleymaniye, Sinan writes:

This well-proportioned mosque became a Ka’ba.  
Its four columns became [like] the Four Friends.  
The House of Islam on four pillars  
Was strengthened by the Four Friends.<sup>46</sup>

In this poem, Sinan links the four columns of the Suleymaniye mosque complex to the Four Chosen Friends of the Prophet. This connection to the earliest Caliphs of Islam enabled the Suleymaniye to become “a Ka’ba.” The four columns of the Suleymaniye posit Suleiman I as the foremost authority within the Islamic world, which challenged Islamic authorities throughout the Middle East. The consideration of the Suleymaniye as “a Ka’ba” threatened the authority of Islamic leaders of Mecca, considered the holiest city of Islam due to its possession of the Ka’ba, the holiest relic of Islam. The location of the Suleymaniye established Istanbul as a rival to Mecca in consideration as the holiest city of Islam. The Suleymaniye advanced the imperial legitimacy of Suleiman I across the Islamic world in its claims to spiritual authority as a rival Ka’ba to that of Mecca. Through its representation of Ottoman conquests and

<sup>39</sup> Sinan, *Sinan’s Autobiographies: Five Sixteenth-Century Texts*, 66.

<sup>40</sup> Sinan, 122.

<sup>41</sup> Arthur Conan Doyle, “Night of Power in the Mosque of Sophia,” in *Istanbul Anthology: Travel Writing through the Centuries*, ed. Kaya Genç (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2015), 68.

<sup>42</sup> Çebeli, *Narrative of Travels*, 76.

<sup>43</sup> Çebeli, 76.

<sup>44</sup> Sinan, *Sinan’s Autobiographies: Five Sixteenth-Century Texts*, 123.

<sup>45</sup> Adam J. Silverstein, *Islamic History: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 15.

<sup>46</sup> Sinan, 123.

connections to early Islamic authority, the Suleymaniye mosque complex furthered imperial legitimacy under Suleiman I not just within Istanbul, but throughout the Islamic world.

### Ahmed I and the Blue Mosque

Upon becoming Sultan in 1603, Ahmed I inherited an empire in decline. Throughout the 16<sup>th</sup> century, inefficient governmental regulation surrounding tax collection led to diminished state tax revenues.<sup>47</sup> This situation weakened Ottoman economic power and restricted imperial expansion efforts. Earlier military conquests under Sultans like Suleiman I became threatened by the strength of the Hapsburgs throughout Central Europe. Warfare between the Hapsburgs and the Ottoman empire continued throughout the 16<sup>th</sup> century, from the siege of Vienna in 1529 to the Thirteen Years' War (1593-1606).<sup>48</sup> The Thirteen Years' War concluded with Ahmed I's signing of the Peace Treaty of Zsitva-Torok, which recognized the Hapsburg Emperor as his equal.<sup>49</sup> This peace treaty brought humiliation to the Ottoman empire and prompted a new wave of imperial legitimation efforts, most notably the Blue Mosque of Sultan Ahmed I.

In 1609, Ahmed I began the construction of the Blue Mosque by personally cutting the first turf for the mosque's foundations. During the following eight years, Ahmed I remained highly involved in the mosque's construction, even personally approaching the Venetian government to acquire colored glass for the windows of the mosque.<sup>50</sup> Sultan Ahmed's imperial mosque quickly gained the nickname "The Blue Mosque" through its usage of turquoise tiles on both the interior and exterior of the mosque. Beyond the involvement of Ahmed I, imperial architect Mehmed Agha directed the construction of the Blue Mosque. Although Agha incorporated various elements of the imperial mosques of Sinan in the Blue Mosque, Agha sought to create a distinctive identity for the Blue Mosque. Agha distinguished the Blue Mosque from earlier imperial mosques, notably the Suleymaniye through his usage of four semi-domes instead of vaulted arches to support the mosque's central dome.<sup>51</sup> The Blue Mosque was distinct from other imperial mosques in its location. Unlike the imperial mosques of Mehmet II and Suleiman I, the Blue Mosque was built adjacent to the Topkapi Palace, the seat of Ottoman governance within Istanbul. This proximity between the two buildings indicates its usage in imperial processions and its importance to constructions of imperial legitimacy during the sultanate of Ahmed I.<sup>52</sup> Along with these distinctive features, the Blue Mosque differed from earlier imperial mosques in its conscious efforts at imperial legitimation beyond Istanbul.

The Blue Mosque of Ahmed I inspired imperial legitimacy beyond Istanbul through its representations of imperial piety. One essential feature of the Blue Mosque is its usage of six minarets, instead of the typical four minarets surrounding a mosque.<sup>53</sup> Among the mosques of the Islamic world, the only other mosque to have six minarets was the Great Mosque of Mecca, the holiest site of within Islam. In its usage of six minarets, the Blue Mosque embodied the piety and devotion to Islam of Ahmed I and deliberately sought to rival "the splendor of the holy Kaaba."<sup>54</sup> The usage of six minarets provoked immense conflict between Ahmed I and religious leaders throughout the Islamic world,

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<sup>47</sup> Murat Çiçaçra, "The Ottoman government and economic life: Taxation, public finance and trade controls," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 2, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi and Kate Fleet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 272.

Within the scope of my research and the various considerations of this assignment, I felt that a thorough discussion of the Ottoman economic decline of the 16<sup>th</sup> century would be inappropriate. See Çiçaçra 252-275 for an analysis of the economic crises throughout the 16<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>48</sup> Géza Dávid, "Ottoman armies and warfare, 1453-1603," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 2, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi and Kate Fleet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 276.

<sup>49</sup> Levey, *The World of Ottoman Art*, 101.

<sup>50</sup> Levey, 101.

<sup>51</sup> Ünver Rüstem, "The Spectacle of Legitimacy: The Dome Closing Ceremony of the Sultan Ahmed Mosque," *Muqarnas* 33, no. 1 (2016), 257.

<sup>52</sup> Rüstem, "The Spectacle of Legitimacy: The Dome Closing Ceremony of the Sultan Ahmed Mosque," 253.

<sup>53</sup> Levey, *The World of Ottoman Art*, 102.

<sup>54</sup> Théophile Gautier, "Sultan Achmet and Sultan Bayezid Mosques," in *Istanbul Anthology: Travel Writing through the centuries*, ed. Kaya Genç (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2015), 72.

like the Sharif of Mecca.<sup>55</sup> This controversy was eventually resolved through the construction of another minaret at the Great Mosque of Mecca. Along with its six minarets, the inclusion of the covers of the Ka'ba in the courtyard of the Blue Mosque furthered the rivalry between Istanbul and Mecca within the Islamic world.<sup>56</sup> The inclusion of Islamic relics in the Blue Mosque reflected the importance of piety and devotion to Ahmed I along with attempts to inspire pilgrimage to Istanbul instead of Mecca. Pilgrimage to Istanbul instead of Mecca subverted the spiritual power held by Mecca as the destination of the hajj.<sup>57</sup> Through its six minarets and important Islamic relics, the Blue Mosque bestowed upon Ottoman Istanbul strong claims to spiritual legitimacy within the Islamic world. These various features of the Blue Mosque represent imperial legitimation efforts that focused beyond Istanbul as they advanced the spiritual legitimacy of Istanbul in comparison to other cities throughout the Islamic world. Political control over the Blue Mosque ultimately legitimized the Ottoman sultanate as its spiritual significance implied divine favor for its Ottoman rulers. The Blue Mosque's displays of imperial piety furthered imperial legitimacy beyond the city of Istanbul.

### Conclusion

Throughout the first 150 years of Ottoman governance in Istanbul, the imperial mosques of each Sultan played an essential role in imperial legitimation. Each imperial mosque served as a visual representation of each Sultan's rule within the Ottoman state. For Mehmet II, the Fatih Mosque served as a physical embodiment of the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul. In its appropriation of the Church of the Holy Apostles, innovations in art and architecture, and imitation of the Hagia Sophia, the Fatih Mosque complex established connections between Ottoman rule and the city's Byzantine past while legitimizing Ottoman governance. The Suleymaniye Mosque complex of Suleiman I continued to establish imperial legitimacy within Istanbul. While its imitation of the Hagia Sophia advanced Ottoman legitimacy through connections with the Istanbul's history, its appeals to early Islamic authority furthered imperial legitimacy throughout the Islamic world. By the rule of Sultan Ahmed I in the early 17<sup>th</sup> century, construction of imperial mosques asserted imperial legitimacy beyond Istanbul through representations of imperial piety and the centrality of Istanbul within the Islamic world.

Ahmed I's Blue Mosque marked the last imperial mosque of Istanbul. During the reigns of Ahmed I's successors, economic and political crises prevented the construction of imperial mosques. As successive sultanates contended with civil war and the diminished role of the Ottoman empire within global trade, the imperial mosques of Istanbul evolved into relics of the Ottoman past and as sites of Ottoman memory.<sup>58</sup> Within Istanbul, the imperial mosques of Mehmet II, Suleyman I, and Ahmed I carry material, symbolic, and functional meaning as sites of Ottoman memory. The imperial mosques of Istanbul represent the importance of architecture in conquest and in the definition of imperial identity through conquest and piety. These imperial mosques reveal the evolutions in imperial legitimation among the first sultans of Istanbul. As sites of memory, the Ottoman imperial mosques of Istanbul ultimately represent the construction of imperial legitimacy and the assertion of imperial authority.

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<sup>55</sup> Tülay Artan, "Art and architecture," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 3, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqhi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 453.

The Sharif of Mecca was the title given to the traditional religious leader of the holy cities of Mecca, Medina, and the surrounding region of Western Saudi Arabia. This position first emerged during the Fatimid Caliphate (967-1101 CE) until the conquest of the holy cities by the Saudis in 1925.


<sup>56</sup> Hughes, *Istanbul: A Tale of Three Cities*, 409.

<sup>57</sup> The "hajj" refers to the pilgrimage to Mecca that all physically and financially capable Muslims must complete at least once in their lives.

<sup>58</sup> Levey, *The World of Ottoman Art*, 107.

Appendix A: Map Of Istanbul, Sixteenth Century

This map of 16<sup>th</sup> century Istanbul comes from Bettany Hughes' *Istanbul: A Tale of Three Cities*. While



included on print in Hughes' text, the map that appears in this paper is the combination of two scans of Hughes' original map. Through this map, one can observe the positions of the Hagia Sophia, the Fatih Mosque, the Suleymaniye Mosque complex and the Blue Mosque in relation to one another and to the Topkapi Palace, the Ottoman seat of government.

Hughes, Bettany. *Istanbul: A Tale of Three Cities*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2017. 372-373.

## Appendix B: The Hagia Sophia



This photograph of the Hagia Sophia appears on the website for the Hagia Sophia Museum, under the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism. In this photograph, the viewer can understand the Ottoman conversion of the exterior of the Hagia Sophia through the addition of four surrounding minarets.

*The Hagia Sophia: Exterior.* From The Hagia Sophia Museum, Istanbul. <https://ayasofyamuzesi.gov.tr/en/ext-exterior>. Accessed 20 May 2019.



Appendix C: The Fatih Mosque Of Mehmet II



This photograph of the Fatih Mosque of Mehmet II details its central dome and surrounding domes in the architectural model of the Hagia Sophia. This photograph comes from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and was taken by Ottoman imperial photographers Pascal Sébah and Polycarpe Joaillier.

Sébah, Pascal and Joaillier, Polycarpe. *Fatih Camii*. Late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Fine Arts Library, Harvard College Library.

In Archnet, [https://archnet.org/sites/1982/media\\_contents/7752](https://archnet.org/sites/1982/media_contents/7752).

Appendix D: The Süleymaniye Mosque Complex Of Süleiman I



This photograph of the Süleymaniye Mosque complex, taken by Reha Gühay, appears in Gülru Negipoglu's *The Age of Sinan: Architectural Culture in the Ottoman Empire* (2005). This photograph displays the immensity of the central dome of the Süleymaniye Mosque along with a fraction of its surrounding domes.

Gühay, Reha. *Süleymaniye Külliyesi*. Necipoğlu, Gülru. *The Age of Sinan: Architectural Culture in the Ottoman Empire*. London: Reaktion Books, 2005.

Appendix E: The Blue Mosque Of Sultan Ahmed I



This photograph of the Blue Mosque of Sultan Ahmed I was taken by Arnstein Rønning in 2013. This photograph includes the six minarets surrounding the mosque that prompted conflict between Ahmed I and religious leaders throughout Islam. From this image, one can understand why the Sultan Ahmed Mosque gained the nickname “the Blue Mosque.”

Rønning, Arnstein. *The Sultan Ahmed Mosque or Sultan Ahmet Camii or the Blue Mosque in Istanbul, Turkey*. 22 April 2013. Available through Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License.

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## The Evolution of Albert Camus's Views on Political Violence in *Combat*, 1944-1947

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In his 1951 work, *the Rebel*, French philosopher Albert Camus attacked the use of ideology or the invocation of historical direction to justify not only revolution but the political murder that often accompanied it.<sup>1</sup> He bluntly opened his book length essay by asserting that the criminals of the first half of the Twentieth Century had “the perfect alibi: philosophy, which can be used for any purpose—even for transforming murderers into judges.”<sup>2</sup> In other words, Camus argued that the revolutionary ideologies of his age were dangerous because their adherents believed the revolution's ends, utopia for instance, were such a worthwhile achievement that any means were morally acceptable, even political murder. Interestingly, however, seven years earlier during the Allied liberation of Paris, Camus wrote in the French Resistance newspaper *Combat* articles in favor of revolution and violence.<sup>3</sup>

This paper, then, is an examination of the evolution of Albert Camus's views regarding political and revolutionary violence during the time he was chief editor of *Combat* between 1944 and 1947. It addresses the following questions. First, what were Camus's initial views during the initial weeks and months following the liberation of France? Second, what type of revolution did he advocate during those days? Third, how did Camus feel about the widespread retaliation and reprisals against former Vichy officials as well as French collaborators following the liberation? Fourth, when did his views begin to change towards a rejection of political violence? Finally, what was the cause of this change? By answering these questions, I will argue that Camus initially supported the idea of revolution and its necessity for violence. It was only after the failure of French post-liberation purges and his subsequent feelings of disillusionment that he rejected political and revolutionary violence and advocated ideas that he would eventually put to paper in *the Rebel*.

### Liberation as Revolution

During the Second World War, the liberation of Paris began on the 19 of August 1944. Two days later, *Combat*, which had been underground during the occupation, was published openly for the first time on 21 August 1944. The day's article, “Combat Continues...” began by stating that “After fifty months of occupation, of struggle and sacrifice, Paris is reborn to the sense of freedom, despite shots suddenly exploding in the streets.”<sup>4</sup> The image of the city being reborn was telling and a rather significant theme of the article. Camus demanded that the French use the occasion of liberation as an opportunity to create a more equal and liberal France. “It will not be enough,” he wrote, “to return to the mere appearance of liberty with which the France of 1939 had to be content. We will have accomplished only an infinitesimal part of our task if tomorrow's French Republic finds itself, like the Third Republic, confined by the domination of Money.”<sup>5</sup> Put more simply, the French liberation would be wasted if the economic inequality of the interwar period was to reassert itself. For Camus, the French must take the opportunity to reshape their country so it was not entirely dominated by the rich. “Money, he continued, “to conserve and increase its privileges, hoisted traitors to power and deliberately tied its interests to Hitler's.”<sup>6</sup> To further support his call for a reshaping of France, Camus conflated the rich with those who had collaborated with the Nazis and laid on their shoulders responsibility for the Vichy Government, which he claimed had been led by men who had been “masters” lording over the working class.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, for Camus, at least initially, liberation was not only a moment to continue the war against Germany but also a chance to reshape French society.

The idea that France must be reshaped without returning to its old ways was best illustrated in Camus's 2 September 1944 article, “To Make Democracy.” Charles de Gaulle, then leader of the Free French Forces had,

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<sup>1</sup> Tony Judt, *the Burden of Responsibility: Blum, Camus, Aron, and the French Twentieth Century* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 94.

<sup>2</sup> Albert Camus, *the Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt* (New York: Random House, 1984), 3.

<sup>3</sup> See Albert Camus “Combat Continues...21 August 1944” in *Between Hell and Reason: Essays from the Resistance Combat, 1944-1947*, edited and translated by Alexandre de Gramont (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 39.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 39

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 40

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 40

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 40

according to the article, met with the leadership of the French Socialist Party and the group suggested that the new government include veteran politicians from the pre-war regime. Commenting, Camus wrote, "We are perplexed by the inclusion of these 'veteran statesmen,' who to be brief, have not performed so brilliantly that we would note our solidarity with them. Many of them have betrayed France, willfully or out of weakness."<sup>8</sup> The inclusion of politicians belonging to the Third Republic did little to signify a rebirth of France. They had been part of "a system which consecrated the privileges of money and the wedding of political lobbies with personal ambition."<sup>9</sup> Therefore, they represented the economic inequality of the interwar period that, as seen above, Camus was passionately advocating needed to be avoided during France's postwar rebirth. "We are angered that, after all that has happened, we have to repeat: the old order with which they could start all over again today was never democracy but only its caricature. As for true democracy, we will have to make it ourselves."<sup>10</sup> After four years of occupation, collaboration, and resistance, a return to the pre-war order was unacceptable. The people of France would have to take the lead in creating a new democracy.

If Camus's argument for a rebirth of France sounded like a call for revolution, that is because it was. A month after the liberation of Paris, in an article commenting on the first meeting of the National Liberation Movement, the provisional government of France, Camus described the French Resistance as "in revolt" from 1940 until liberation. "But there comes a time," he exclaimed "when revolt spreads from heart to spirit, when a feeling becomes an idea, when impulse leads to concerted action. This is the moment of revolution."<sup>11</sup> In other words, Camus called on France to make liberation not only an opportunity for rebirth but for a full-fledged revolution. On 1 October 1944, Camus outlined the objectives of the resistance who he now believed were leading that revolution. "Our plan," he wrote, "is to make justice reign through the economy and to guarantee freedom through politics...what we want for France is a collectivist economy and a liberal political structure."<sup>12</sup> Camus called for a radical reshaping of both the French economic and political system. According to historian Susan Dunn, "In the emotionally charged days of the Liberation, he [Camus] sensed a new revolutionary order - based on justice and fraternal communion - being born in what superficially appeared to be the disorder of the war's end."<sup>13</sup> It was to combine the collectivist economy of socialism with the political institutions of liberal democracy. Only then, according to Camus, could freedom be protected while also enshrining the fundamental rights of the workers. "What we want," he wrote, "is to make justice compatible with freedom." To accomplish this paradox, the power of the majority was not to be held by a privileged few and above all there was to be equal opportunity.<sup>14</sup> In the space of a month, Camus had went from simply calling for a reshaping of French society so as to not repeat the mistakes of the Third Republic to full blown revolution and the institution of new political and economic systems.

In the weeks and months following liberation, Camus was vague regarding whether the use of violence was acceptable to achieve the revolution's goals. In the context of defeating the Germans so that the revolution could succeed, violence was necessary. On 23 August 1944, in an article entitled "They [the Germans] will not escape," Camus asserted "Our future, our revolution are here now in their entirety, filled with cries of anger, passion, and freedom. It is not we who want to kill. But we have been forced to either kill or kneel."<sup>15</sup> Seemingly, Camus was advocating revolutionary violence against the Germans. With the liberation, the revolution was at hand and completing the defeat of the Germans ensured that one possible enemy of that revolution was defeated. "A people

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<sup>8</sup> Albert Camus, "2 September 1944 To Make Democracy," in *Between Hell and Reason: Essays from the Resistance Combat, 1944-1947*, edited and translated by Alexandre de Gramont (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 49.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 50

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.

<sup>11</sup> Albert Camus, "19 September 1944 [The N.L.M's first public meeting]," in *Between Hell and Reason: Essays from the Resistance Combat, 1944-1947*, edited and translated by Alexandre de Gramont (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 55.

<sup>12</sup> Albert Camus, "1 October 1944 [Combat wants to make justice compatible with freedom]," in *Between Hell and Reason: Essays from the Resistance Combat, 1944-1947*, edited and translated by Alexandre de Gramont (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 57.

<sup>13</sup> Susan Dunn, "From Burke to Camus: Reconceiving the Revolution," *Salmagundi*, No. 84 (1989): 224

<sup>14</sup> Camus, "1 October 1944," 57.

<sup>15</sup> Albert Camus, "23 August 1944 They will not Escape," in *Between Hell and Reason: Essays from the Resistance Combat, 1944-1947*, edited and translated by Alexandre de Gramont (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 41.

who want to live free,” he continued “do not wait for someone to bring their freedom. They take it. In so doing, they help themselves as well as those who would come to their aid.”<sup>16</sup> In other words, revolting against the retreating German occupiers guaranteed not only French freedom but also assisted the Allies in their war effort, therefore guaranteeing overall German defeat.

However, Camus was more unclear when it came to revolutionary violence against fellow Frenchman. On 19 September 1944, he asserted that “Revolution is not necessarily the guillotine and machine guns; it is machine guns when necessary.”<sup>17</sup> While the statement was relatively vague and Camus did not clarify what he meant, it seemed to argue against indiscriminate violence. There was, however, still an implication that if violence was necessary to protect the revolution, it was acceptable.

In fact, in the latter months of 1944, revolutionary violence against suspected collaborationists was necessary according to Camus. In October of that year, novelist François Mauriac wrote a column in *Le Figaro* arguing against the execution of collaborators in the interest of national unity. On 20 October 1944, Camus wrote a response to him published in *Combat*. “We, too, do not believe it necessary,” he began, “to kill our citizens on street corners or diminish the authority of a government we have freely recognized.”<sup>18</sup> Just as he did a month earlier, Camus condemned and did not endorse indiscriminate violence. However, he would reaffirm his belief in violence where necessary when he said, “the nation has not understood that it has been betrayed by certain interests, and that it can only be revived by destroying those interests without the slightest pity.” In other words, in order for the reshaping of French society to occur, those who had worked with Vichy government or with the Germans were to be punished rather than forgiven. In an article written the following day, Camus asserted that France was fighting a war while also making a revolution and as a result “there are impossible pardons and necessary revolutions,” thus reasserting his position of the following day. In order to make the desired revolution, those who betrayed France could not be pardoned. By taking such a position, Camus, according to historian Susan Dunn, “distinguished between the moral man, who might love and forgive his enemies, and the politically-minded citizen, who demands their punishment.”<sup>19</sup> In October of 1944, Camus was concerned only with the politically-minded citizen, believing revolution so necessary for France that he advocated the punishment and execution of French collaborators.

On 25 October 1944, Camus again reaffirmed his position against Mauriac. “Since 1939,” he wrote, “We have truly learned that not to destroy certain men would be to betray the good of this country.”<sup>20</sup> By implication, Camus condemned the leadership of pre-war France and grouped them in with the collaborators. In doing so, he echoed his writings of August and September of 1944 when he demanded revolution to reshape France without the men who led the Third Republic. Continuing, he wrote that “France carries within itself a diseased body, a minority of men who yesterday brought France sorrow and continue to do so today. These are men of betrayal and injustice. Their very existence poses the problem of justice, for they constitute a living part of this country, and we must decide whether we will destroy them.”<sup>21</sup> According to historian Tony Judt, at this time, Camus believed France was divided into two camps, the “men of the Resistance” and the men of “injustice.” It was the former’s task to eliminate the other so that France could be remade in the immediate postwar era.<sup>22</sup> The above passage fits this analysis. Camus painted the collaborators as a disease that would destroy France from within and only their destruction would not allow them to “pollute the new state and its institutions even before they were formed.”<sup>23</sup> For this reason, he endorsed the use of violence in order to make the revolution in France and for that reason advocated what he called “human justice with all its terrible imperfections.”<sup>24</sup> This last line was in response to Mauriac’s concern that innocent people might be

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>17</sup> Camus, “19 September 1944,” 56.

<sup>18</sup> Albert Camus, “20 October 1944 [Response to Mauriac in defense of the purge],” in *Between Hell and Reason: Essays from the Resistance Combat, 1944-1947*, edited and translated by Alexandre de Gramont (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 66.

<sup>19</sup> Dunn, “From Burke to Camus: Reconciling the Revolution,” 225.

<sup>20</sup> Albert Camus, “25 October 1944 [Again replies to Mauriac that the purge is necessary],” in *Between Hell and Reason: Essays from the Resistance Combat, 1944-1947*, edited and translated by Alexandre de Gramont (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 72.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 72.

<sup>22</sup> Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals 1944-1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 68.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>24</sup> Camus, “25 October 1944,” 72.



swept up in the purges and Camus's choice of imperfect human justice implied an indifference to that fact as long as it removed collaborators so France could be restored.<sup>25</sup>

Therefore, Camus's writings for *Combat* through the end of 1944 asserted drastically different ideas regarding revolution and violence than what he would write in *the Rebel* in 1951. He believed that France's liberation by the Allies was the ideal time for an economic and political revolution in the country, one that rejected the pre-war order and the men who had led it. Furthermore, he advocated for the use of violence to purge France of collaborators and men who had benefited from German occupation, believing they would make the country's rebirth impossible. Overtime, as the purges took place, events would make Camus reconsider his position on both revolution and the use of violence.

### Disillusionment

The purges and post war trials of French collaborators were often arbitrary and their punishments uneven. Those who were necessary for the postwar economic recovery or were needed for leadership roles were often lightly punished or left alone. Journalists and academics on the other hand were heavily purged and attacked as collaborators.<sup>26</sup> According to Judt, the purge became a "combination of verbal violence, selectivity, and bad faith." Camus was immensely disappointed by the way the process was carried out by the end of 1945 he had underwent a change of heart regarding the use of violence in politics.<sup>27</sup>

In fact, his mind had begun to change at the beginning of 1945. On 5 January, he wrote an article describing how the purge had gone awry. While Camus had wished for swift and justice that did not degrade the respect owed to individuals, it was not to be. "We will condemn to death," he wrote, "still more journalists who never deserved anything like the death penalty. We will acquit more officials simply because they were capable of speaking well on their own behalf."<sup>28</sup> Camus's statement highlighted the beginnings of his dissatisfaction with the ongoing purges. Those who were guilty were escaping while those who committed lesser crimes were being given punishments that were not proportional to their actions. However, he was not ready to completely give up on the idea of punishment, writing that "a country which forgoes self-purgation must be prepared to lose its rebirth."<sup>29</sup> Put more simply, while the purges were being poorly carried out, they still punished some of the collaborators so they had some value to the revolution. This sentiment would not last much longer in Camus's writing, however.

On 30 August 1945, he condemned the purge. "Excuse us for starting today with an obvious truth: it is now certain that the purge in France is not only a failure but also a disgrace...it could only have succeeded if undertaken without vengeance or frivolity."<sup>30</sup> By the closing months of 1945, the French liberation purges had become not only arbitrary but a way for political and social enemies to settle old scores.<sup>31</sup> Instead of uniting the nation around a clear understanding of guilt and justice as Camus had hoped, it "encouraged just the sort of moral cynicism and personal self-interest he had sought to overcome."<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, Camus wrote, "Too many have demanded the death penalty, as if forced labor, for example, were not adequate punishment."<sup>33</sup> In this statement, Camus illustrated his rapidly changing view of political violence. Before, he justified the purges by saying they punished collaborators and "destroyed" those who had betrayed France and if not punished would keep her from a rebirth. Now, he argued against even the use of the death penalty. Camus concluded the article by saying, "this process must be changed – not only to stop man from suffering a penalty disproportionate to his errors, but so that justice itself can be maintained and be,

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<sup>25</sup> Judt, *Past Imperfect*, 68.

<sup>26</sup> Diane Rubenstein, "Publish and perish: the "épuration" of French intellectuals," No. 23 (1993), 72.

<sup>27</sup> Judt, *Past Imperfect*, 69.

<sup>28</sup> Albert Camus, "5 January 1945 [The purge has gone awry]," in *Between Hell and Reason: Essays from the Resistance Combat, 1944-1947*, edited and translated by Alexandre de Gramont (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 101.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 102

<sup>30</sup> Albert Camus, "30 August 1945 [The purge is a failure and a disgrace]," in *Between Hell and Reason: Essays from the Resistance Combat, 1944-1947*, edited and translated by Alexandre de Gramont (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 112.

<sup>31</sup> Dunn, "From Burke to Camus: Reconceiving the Revolution," 224,

<sup>32</sup> Judt, *The Burdens of Responsibility*, 111

<sup>33</sup> Camus, "5 January 1945," 112.

at least in one case, respectable.”<sup>34</sup> France’s version of political violence was not only unfairly punishing its citizens but by doing so was distorting the very idea of justice, one of the pillars of Camus’s post-liberation revolution. Put simply, “as the purge rapidly deteriorated into a series of personal vendettas and summary executions, Camus realized that his hopes for meaningful social and political reform would not be fulfilled.”<sup>35</sup>

### Rejection of Violence

In an article published on 20 November 1946, Camus reflected on the previous two years from the liberation through his experience of the purges. After his experience, he remarked he could “no longer hold to any truth that might oblige me directly or indirectly, to condemn a man to death.”<sup>36</sup> In other words, Camus could not follow an ideology or political philosophy that required for its success the death of others. This was quite a change given that only two years earlier he had supported the use of violence against collaborators and advocated the destruction of politicians who had benefited during the occupation. Reflecting on the ideologies around him, Camus remarked that “everyone from Right or Left, except a few hypocrites, believes that his truth is the one that will bring happiness to men. Yet all this good will has produced this infernal world where men are still killed...”<sup>37</sup> An idea that he would echo five years later in *the Rebel*, Camus observed how adherents to an ideology believe they have the ultimate truth that will lead to happiness and will kill in its name to achieve that happiness.

In an article the day before on 19 November 1946, he had warned of a similar danger. “We have seen men lie, dishonor, deport torture; they could not be persuaded to stop because they were so sure of themselves, because it was impossible to persuade an abstraction—that is, the representative of an ideology.”<sup>38</sup> The title of the article was “The Century of Fear” and was a reflection on the ideologies of first half of the Twentieth Century. Those who believed in them, be it fascism on the Right or communism on the Left, justified violence and murder because they believed they held the truth. As a result, Camus believed he lived in “a world of abstractions, bureaucracies and machines, absolute ideas, and crude messianism” where dialogue had come to an end.<sup>39</sup> Dialogue was no longer possible because people surrendered to the ideologies they believed in entirely. This in turn created fear because they were willing to use violence against those who did not believe. Camus rejected this lack of dialogue and acceptance of violence because it created a paradox where “murder is legitimate and where human life is considered trifling.”<sup>40</sup> In other words, Camus now rejected political violence because it made murder a legitimate tool to advance the objectives of an ideology while making human lives mere obstacles in the path of achieving those objectives. Again, this is an evolution in thinking from the end of the final months of 1944 when Camus deemed political murder necessary for the reshaping of France.

On 21 November 1946, Camus applied his new thinking regarding ideologies when analyzing the French Socialist Party in an article entitled “The Confusion of the Socialists.” “The Main task of the last party congress was to reconcile the desire for moral principle that rejects murder with the determination to remain faithful to Marxism. But one cannot reconcile what is irreconcilable.”<sup>41</sup> In other words, the French socialists wanted to condemn the use of political violence but also remain a Marxist party. Camus asserted that this was impossible, implying there was something inherent about the Marxist ideology that led to political murder. He continued, saying that the Socialists

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 113

<sup>35</sup> Alexandre de Gramont, “Translator’s Introduction,” in *Between Hell and Reason: Essays from the Resistance Combat, 1944-1947*, edited and translated by Alexandre de Gramont (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 6.

<sup>36</sup> Albert Camus, “20 November 1946 To Save Lives,” in *Between Hell and Reason: Essays from the Resistance Combat, 1944-1947*, edited and translated by Alexandre de Gramont (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 120.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 121

<sup>38</sup> Albert Camus, “19 November 1946 The Century of Fear,” in *Between Hell and Reason: Essays from the Resistance Combat, 1944-1947*, edited and translated by Alexandre de Gramont (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 118.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 118.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 119

<sup>41</sup> Albert Camus, “23 November 1946 The Confusion of the Socialists,” in *Between Hell and Reason: Essays from the Resistance Combat, 1944-1947*, edited and translated by Alexandre de Gramont (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 124.

had a choice to make. “They will admit that the ends justify the means, which is to say that murder can be legitimized; or they will reject Marxism as an absolute philosophy.”<sup>42</sup> Because Marxism was an ideology that claimed to know the direction of history was moving towards utopia, Camus implied by saying “the ends justify the means” that the ideology’s final goal ultimately led to murder because its adherents believe the ultimate goal is worth the cost. Camus’s analysis of the French Socialists illustrated the evolution of his views on political violence. He thought it was impossible for an ideology with revolutionary goals to avoid violence, whereas two years earlier he thought violence could be employed only when necessary to defend the revolution and advocated its use.

By the end of 1946, Camus had rejected revolution along the violence he believed came with it. In an article, entitled, “The New Meaning of Revolution,” he wrote, “Ideally, revolution is a change of political and economic institutions so that freedom and justice can prevail. Realistically revolution is a complex of often miserable historical events that are meant to bring about this happy transformation.”<sup>43</sup> In one sense, this seems to be a reflection on the attempted post-liberation revolution and the realization of its failure. Like Camus’s description, that revolution, as discussed above, sought to bring about freedom and justice but instead brought about a series of purges that punished arbitrarily and unevenly. Therefore, revolution had not been worth its cost. Continuing, he wrote that “seizing power through violence is a romantic idea; the advanced technology of weapons has made this a fantasy.”<sup>44</sup> Not only did revolution cause a series of miseries but it also proved costly because of modern weaponry and technology. As a result, Camus rejected romanticism surrounding 1789 and 1918. “They are historical dates, but they are no longer historical examples.”<sup>45</sup> Therefore, he concluded by asserting that man must reject the idea of utopia and accept “relative utopia which leaves men the choice to act freely.”<sup>46</sup>

### Conclusion

For Albert Camus, the time between French liberation in August 1944 and the end of 1946 was one of learning and reassessment. In the span of two years, he transformed from a champion of revolution and necessary violence to an advocate of nonviolence and the rejection of revolution as a way to transform the world. In 1944, Camus was caught up in the spirit of the Resistance and believed France’s liberation was an opportunity for the rebirth of the nation as one based on both political and economic equality. To achieve equality in both areas, he promoted a nationwide revolution led by the veterans of the French Resistance. Fearing the reestablishment of the institutions of the prewar French government, Camus advocated the use of violence in the form of purges to punish those who collaborated with the Nazis or failed France during or before its occupation. It was only after these purges turned into arbitrary show trials and summary executions that Camus, in 1945, began to reconsider his position. By 1946, he began expressing ideas that were to be main themes in his 1951 work *the Rebel*, namely the rejection of ideologies that legitimized murder as well as revolution as a reasonable path to change.

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 125

<sup>43</sup> Albert Camus, “23 November 1946 The New Meaning of Revolution,” in *Between Hell and Reason: Essays from the Resistance Combat, 1944-1947*, edited and translated by Alexandre de Gramont (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 125.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 126

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 126

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 126

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# The Hong Kong Housing Crisis: A Historical Analysis of the Repeal of the Touch Base Policy

Raymond Thompson

## Introduction

Hong Kong is a special administrative region in China, bordering the Guangdong Province in Southeastern China. Following their defeat in the Opium Wars, China was forced to give many concessions to the British Empire, one of them being the 99-year lease of Hong Kong to the British Empire from 1898 until 1997. British rule over Hong Kong would go uninterrupted until the Japanese Empire took control of the region in December 1941. It was not until 1945 that the British Empire regained control of Hong Kong. Since the repatriation of Hong Kong in 1945, its population has increased by over 1,200%.<sup>47</sup> This quick population growth combined with the ever-shrinking amount of available land, has caused housing prices in Hong Kong to rise to unsustainable levels since the mid-1980's, resulting in a housing crisis.

The purpose of this paper is to examine why Hong Kong is in this situation by looking at the repeal of the Touch Base Policy (TBP) in 1980, and its effect on housing prices. The TBP was a policy created in 1974 that stated that all illegal immigrants from mainland China who could make it to the urban areas of Hong Kong would not face deportation.<sup>48</sup> Its repeal in 1980 saw the implementation of harsher border control policies that made it illegal for anyone to cross the border between China and Hong Kong under any circumstances. One reason that the repeal will be analyzed is because the government of Hong Kong foresaw that housing prices and government housing subsidies would rise if population growth was not restrained. For the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government the one way that they could help restrain the already rapidly growing population was by stopping illegal immigration from China. Another reason that this event will be examined is because the timing of the repeal coincides with the rapid rise in housing prices in Hong Kong.

To see if the repeal of the TBP had any effects on housing prices, this paper will first examine the growth of Hong Kong's population from 1945 until 1965. This section will discuss the history of Hong Kong's immigration policies and the various geopolitical and economic factors that fueled illegal immigration from mainland China. After this, the paper will focus on illegal immigration into Hong Kong from 1965 until 1980, by looking at the events both in Hong Kong and China. The illegal immigration that occurred between 1965 and 1980 brought about the creation and then subsequent repeal of the TBP. The next section will focus on the immediate effects of the repeal of the TBP on both illegal immigration and housing prices. The final section will discuss the reasons why housing prices continued to rise and the long-term effects that the TBP had on illegal immigration.

## Historiography

The history of the TBP and its effects on Hong Kong's housing market is an area in which there is little scholarly research. Few sources look at the connection between the immigration policies during British Rule and their effects on housing. One such source, "British Colonialism and "Illegal" Immigration from Mainland China to Hong Kong" by economist Fujio Mizuoka, looks at illegal immigration from the mainland through the lens of an economist, where Mizuoka focused mostly on how illegal immigration affected wages and the labor market. Mizuoka, unlike most sources, does mention housing but only gives a broad analysis of the effects that illegal immigrants had on the housing market.

Most other sources treat illegal immigration and Hong Kong's housing market as two separate issues. One example is the article "Effects of Land Policies and Development Strategies on Housing: A Case of Hong Kong" by Shu Wang, who examines the housing crisis by looking at the region's history of restrictive land policies and lack of readily available land. Another article, "Immigration from China and the Future of Hong Kong" by John P. Burns, only investigates the effects of and public reaction to illegal immigration policy in Hong Kong under British rule.

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<sup>47</sup> Beatrice Lueng and Shun-hing Chan, *Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong, 1950-2000* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), 24; Fan Shuh Ching, *The Population of Hong Kong*. Report. Department of Statistics, University of Hong Kong, CICRED, (1974): 2; Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, *Hong Kong 2016 Population Census* (Hong Kong: Government Press, 2016).

<sup>48</sup> Chung-Tong Wu and Christine Inglis, "Illegal Immigration to Hong Kong," *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 1, no. 3-4 (1992): 604.

Burns does this by looking at the history of illegal migration from mainland China and how these migrants' status changed from refugees to illegal migrants. A similar article, "Immigration Policies, Discourses, and the Politics of Belonging in Hong Kong" by Agnes S. Ku, looks at how the Hong Kong government decided to react to the increasing amount of illegal immigration during the 1950s and 1960s; and also looks at how illegal immigration affected Hong Kong's identity. When searching for scholarly sources, the only source that made a special emphasis on the Touch Base Policy was "Illegal Immigration to Hong Kong" by Chung-Tong Wu and Christine Inglis. But they, just like Burns and Ku, do not look at housing prices but instead focus solely on illegal immigration itself. Given the lack of scholarly research on Hong Kong immigration policy and its effect on the housing market, this paper will offer a new perspective on the subject.

#### 1945-1965: Crisis on the Mainland and Mass Immigration

After seeing a nearly 60% decrease in population due to the Japanese expulsion of Chinese residents during World War II, Hong Kong from 1945-1965 saw an unprecedented population growth that consisted mostly of Chinese immigrants, beginning with the return of the nearly one million expelled Chinese residents.<sup>49</sup> The return of these native peoples to Hong Kong dramatically increased the population from about 550,000 people in 1945 to nearly 1.6 million in 1948, a little more than pre-World War II numbers.<sup>50</sup> Soon after the conclusion of World War II, from 1945-1950, a civil war took place on the Chinese mainland between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) headed by Mao Zedong and the Kuomintang (KMT) led by President Chiang Kai-Shek. The instability on the mainland led to an additional increase in the number of Chinese people, mostly from Guangdong Province, crossing the border into Hong Kong.<sup>51</sup> The increased number of refugees caused the population to swell from 1.6 million people in 1948 to 2.28 million in 1950, with Chinese refugees making up about 14% of the total population.<sup>52</sup>

The increasing number of mainlanders crossing the border posed a problem for the HKSAR government because the flow of migrants into Hong Kong provided cheap labor for Hong Kong businesses which contributed to their economy.<sup>53</sup> But on the other hand, these migrants needed housing and resources in order to live, and the government worried about the potential shortage in resources that could result. Because of this conflict, the British controlled HKSAR government implemented the *Expulsion of Undesirables Ordinance* (1949), whose aim was to expel people considered unproductive within Hong Kong society. Under this law "undesirables" were classified as mainland refugees who were: unskilled laborers incapable of providing for themselves, sick with a contagious illness, maimed, or mentally deficient.<sup>54</sup> This law gave the Hong Kong government a way to somewhat reduce the number of "useless" illegal migrants coming from China, while also preserving the cheap labour market that fueled the economy.

Over the next decade, despite the absence of war, mass migration from the Chinese mainland into Hong Kong continued with the *Expulsion of Undesirables Ordinance* doing little to stop it. This caused the population of Hong Kong to grow from 2.2 million in 1950 to 3.13 million by the end of the decade, with 50% of the population now consisting of migrants mostly from mainland China.<sup>55</sup> Given that the civil war between the CCP and KMT ended in 1950, the migrants coming from China were no longer considered war refugees by the HKSAR government, and were now considered illegal immigrants.<sup>56</sup> The reason for the continuous flow of people across the border was the sweeping reforms that the newly empowered CCP government enacted in their mission to institute a sustainable Communist regime, specifically the Hundred Flowers Reform (1957) and the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960).

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<sup>49</sup> John P. Burns, "Immigration from China and the Future of Hong Kong," *Asian Survey* 27, no. 6 (1987): 662; Lueng and Chan, *Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong, 1950-2000*, 24, doi:10.2307/2644542.

<sup>50</sup> Burns, "Immigration from China and the Future of Hong Kong," 662; Shuh Ching, *The Population of Hong Kong*, 2.

<sup>51</sup> Fujio Mizuoka, "British Colonialism and "Illegal" Immigration from Mainland China to Hong Kong," *Power Relations, Situated Practices, and the Politics of the Commons: Japanese Contributions to the History of Geographical Thought* 11, (2017): 54.

<sup>52</sup> Burns, "Immigration from China and the Future of Hong Kong," 663; Lueng and Chan, *Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong, 1950-2000*, 24.

<sup>53</sup> Mizuoka, "British Colonialism and "Illegal" Immigration from Mainland China to Hong Kong," 38.

<sup>54</sup> British Empire, *Expulsion of Undesirables Ordinance*, 1949.

<sup>55</sup> Lueng and Chan, *Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong, 1950-2000*, 24; Shuh Ching, *The Population of Hong Kong*, 2, 8.

<sup>56</sup> Mizuoka, "British Colonialism and "Illegal" Immigration from Mainland China to Hong Kong," 42.

The Hundred Flowers Reform of 1957 was the CCP's attempt to foster an environment of free thought and open criticism of the new Communist regime, with top Communist official, Lu Dingyi, saying "Let a hundred flowers bloom: let a hundred schools of thought contend."<sup>57</sup> Seizing upon their newfound ability to speak out and present their beliefs, Chinese intellectuals and scientists began criticizing the CCP for interfering with their work, the lack of access to Western publications, and the failed promises of the new Communist regime. Because of the growing amount of criticism that these intellectuals were levying upon the government, the Hundred Flowers Reform ultimately devolved from a campaign for free speech into a campaign that tried to oust so-called "rightists", or intellectuals and members of the government who were considered enemies of the state; with the CCP claiming that at least five percent of the local Communist leadership consisted of anti-communists. This assertion by the CCP resulted in the creation of a 5 percent quota requirement where local government branches had to get rid of 5 percent of their leadership, forcing those accused of being an anti-communist to flee.<sup>58</sup>

The next crucial reform made by the CCP, the Great Leap Forward, was the CCP's plan to reinvigorate the Chinese economy following the Korean War through a significant increase in China's steel and iron production. To achieve said goal, Mao's regime chose to group China's mostly rural population into communes that would devote their time to creating steel and iron in "backyard" furnaces. This plan ultimately proved disastrous given the fact that these recruits were inexperienced and made shoddy, unusable steel.<sup>59</sup> Steel and iron production were not the only sectors of the economy that underperformed during this period. Grain production also suffered causing the government during tax collection to have to garnish more grain than usual from the already depleted rural areas. The increasing amount of grains procured during tax collection caused a famine throughout the country where an estimated 20-30 million people died from starvation and malnutrition, with an estimated 93,000 Chinese people illegally migrating into Hong Kong as a result.<sup>60</sup>

#### 1965-1980: Cultural Revolution and the Creation of TBP

Following the reforms of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the CCP once again implemented sweeping reforms that would continue to increase the illegal migrant population in Hong Kong. From 1971 to 1981 the population of Hong Kong increased from 3.94 million people to 5.11 million, with the proportion of the population consisting of Chinese mainlanders slightly decreasing from 50% (1.97 million) in 1950 to 40% (2.04 million) in 1980.<sup>61</sup> Beginning in the late 1960s and lasting into the 1970s, Mao Zedong and his Communist regime introduced what is now known as the Cultural Revolution, which was an attempt to solidify Mao's rule and oust any political dissidents from China. Following the disastrous policy, the Great Leap Forward, there was a split between major leaders of the CCP over how to guide China's future. On one side was Mao Zedong who believed that all he needed was the people and that collectivism would work in the end. On the opposing side were influential leaders such as Liu Shaoqi, former Chairmen of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Deng Xiaoping, who both believed that the failures of the Great Leap Forward showed the inherent flaws of Mao's plans. Believing that the prospect of collectivism was not strong enough to overpower one's human nature, being that "one is most motivated by rewards, bonuses, and higher wages when they excel or work harder than others."<sup>62</sup> Seeing this as a threat to his newly established power structure, Mao commenced a campaign that would see the persecution, torture, and deaths of an unknown multitude of people labeled as enemies of the state, with estimates ranging anywhere from 400,000 to tens of millions of people.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Lu Dingyi, 1964. "Let a hundred flowers blossom, and a hundred schools of thought contend!": a speech on the policy of the Communist Party of China on art, literature and science delivered on May 26, 1956 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press).

<sup>58</sup> Frederick C. Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950-1965* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 233.

<sup>59</sup> R. Keith Schoppa, *Revolution and its Past: Identities and Change in Modern China History* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017), 330-2.

<sup>60</sup> Peng Xizhe, "Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces," *Population and Development Review* 13, no. 4 (1987): 639, doi:10.2307/1973026; Judith Banister, *China's Changing Population* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 85, 118; Shuh Ching, *The Population of Hong Kong.*, 3.

<sup>61</sup> Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, *Hong Kong 1991 Population Census* (Hong Kong: Government Press, 1993), 21.

<sup>62</sup> Schoppa, *Revolution and its Past: Identities and Change in Modern China History*, 347.

<sup>63</sup> Maurice Meisner, *Mao's China: A History of the People's Republic* (New York: Free Press, 1999), 324.

The humanitarian crisis unfolding on the mainland created a conflict for the Hong Kong government, who saw the potential economic benefits of having more migrant laborers coming across the border as a good thing. But the only problem was that the government knew that if more migrants came across the border then that would require housing and resources in order for these people to live, with most migrants requiring these things to be subsidized by the government. By 1974 the HKSAR government was spending around HK \$300 million, or about 0.9% of its nominal GDP, on government subsidized housing, medical care, and education for the new immigrants.<sup>64</sup> This large amount of spending was especially problematic for the HKSAR government given that GDP growth dropped from 12.4% in 1973 to 2.3% in 1974.<sup>65</sup> To address these two conflicting issues the government came up with the Touch Base Policy (TBP) in 1974, which stated that all illegal immigrants from the PRC who made it to urban areas of Hong Kong would be allowed to stay.<sup>66</sup> This compromise allowed the HKSAR government to restrict the number of illegal immigrants coming from the mainland, while also still being able to benefit from cheap labour.

But as the 1970's came to an end public opinion of the TBP began to turn, forcing the government to reevaluate the very law itself. In 1980 the Hong Kong government launched an inquiry to investigate the effectiveness of the policy and its potential economic impact. The results of the inquiry presented three important statistics that would ultimately decide the fate of the law. The first major finding of the inquiry was that 20% of illegal immigrants crossing in from China were able to "touch base", with the rest being detained by either Chinese or Hong Kong officials. The second finding showed that, if left unchanged, the TBP would cost the government HK \$3.5 billion to continue providing subsidized services to illegal immigrants; representing a 2.1% increase in the amount of nominal GDP needed to fund such projects since the policy's inception in 1974.<sup>67</sup> The last finding revealed that most immigrants who successfully "touched base" were unskilled farmers. These farmers were found to be unproductive in Hong Kong's urban areas and that their presence: depressed wages, overburdened transportation systems, and contributed to social instability.<sup>68</sup> These three discoveries; in addition to the fact that Hong Kong was shifting from a more industrial economy to more of a financial based one, where workers in the financial industry needed skills which these illegal immigrants did not possess; were enough for the government to decide to end the TBP and implement harsher immigration policies.<sup>69</sup>

#### 1980-1991: The ending of TBP and the Rise in Housing Prices

Following the end of the TBP on October 23, 1980, the Hong Kong government implemented a new immigration policy that stated that all illegal immigrants from the Mainland would be repatriated to China whether they made it to urban areas or not. The only exception to the law were made for migrant children whose parents were either already registered as legal residents or were on the other side of the border. If this was the case then their parents could legally be allowed to settle in the city in the name of family reunification.<sup>70</sup> Additionally, the law required that all people over the age of 15 carry with them, at all times, a government ID proving their legal status. The law also stipulated that heavy fines would be placed on any business who either employed people without government IDs or participated in the smuggling of illegal immigrants.

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<sup>64</sup> Burns, "Immigration from China and the Future of Hong Kong," 665; Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, *Estimates of Gross Domestic Product 1966-1981* (Hong Kong: Government Press, 1983), 6.

<sup>65</sup> Mizuoka, "British Colonialism and "Illegal" Immigration from Mainland China to Hong Kong," 52.

<sup>66</sup> Wu and Inglis, "Illegal Immigration to Hong Kong," 604.

<sup>67</sup> Burns, "Immigration from China and the Future of Hong Kong," 667; Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, *Estimates of Gross Domestic Product 1966-1981*, 6.

<sup>68</sup> Burns, "Immigration from China and the Future of Hong Kong.", 667.

<sup>69</sup> Mizuoka, "British Colonialism and "Illegal" Immigration from Mainland China to Hong Kong," 38.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*, 60.






Figure 1. Population of Hong Kong, 1945-2016 (Data adapted from Leung and Chan, CICRED, and Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department)

In the aftermath of the TBP's repeal, the population of Hong Kong continued to grow but at a slower rate. Over the 36-year period from 1945 to 1981 the population, as seen in Figure 1, grew at a rapid rate from about 550,000 people to about 5 million people. While in the latter 36-year period following the repeal of the TBP, the population only grew from 5 million people to about 7.3 million, an increase of only 2.3 million compared to 4.5 million in the previous period.<sup>71</sup> Also, according to the 1991 Hong Kong Census, after the end of the TBP, the proportion of foreign-born residents by the end of the decade remained at about 40%, with the rate of immigrants coming from mainland China to Hong Kong decreasing by nearly 92%.<sup>72</sup> This would seem to imply that the TBP's repeal did in fact curb illegal immigration from the mainland as intended. But again, it should be noted that right at the time that the TBP was repealed, Hong Kong began a transition from a manufacturing-based economy to a financial services-based economy, thereby reducing the need for migrant workers. Also, one year before the repeal, the PRC established the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) that would attract foreign trade and direct investment through their low tax rates, reduced regulations, and cheap labor market. One of China's most well-known SEZs, Shenzhen, was established in 1979 in southern Guangdong Province on the border between China and Hong Kong. The creation of Shenzhen had a huge impact on the reduction of migrants flowing into Hong Kong because about 99.7% of the illegal immigrants in Hong Kong originally came from Guangdong Province in mainland China.<sup>73</sup> The creation of a new economic oasis in Guangdong was more appealing to migrants from the region than Hong Kong because Shenzhen was located within the same province in which these migrants already lived. This meant that migrants who moved to Shenzhen as opposed to Hong Kong would not have to worry about being arrested by border police, having to assimilate into a foreign culture, and being able to easily find work that offered: higher wages, guaranteed housing, and childcare benefits.<sup>74</sup>

Despite the slowing rate of population growth, housing prices started to increase during the late 1980s, and continue doing so today. This increase in housing prices is a result of the rapid increase in demand for housing during

<sup>71</sup> When adjusted for the repatriation of native Hong Kongers following World War II, Hong Kong's population growth from 1945 to 1980 was about 3.6 million.

<sup>72</sup> Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, *Hong Kong 1991 Population Census*, 21.

<sup>73</sup> Mizuoka, "British Colonialism and "Illegal" Immigration from Mainland China to Hong Kong," 54.

<sup>74</sup> Zai Liang, "Foreign Investment, Economic Growth, and Temporary Migration: The Case of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, China," *Development and Society* 21, no. 1 (June 1999): 125.

this time period and the ever-shrinking supply of land. This surge in demand that began in the 1980s and early 1990s can most likely be attributed to two things: 1) the increase in median household income, 2) and the increase in the number of legal immigrants. During the 1980s and early 1990s median household income rose by 237% from HK \$2955 in 1981 to HK \$9964 in 1991, causing people to now start thinking about either first time homeownership or buying a new house.<sup>75</sup> As more and more people thought about buying a new home, the number of loans that people took out also increased, with studies showing that the increase in wages during this period was highly and positively correlated with the increase in the amount of housing loans that banks issued.<sup>76</sup> Thanks to both higher wages and the increasing number of loans available, people who once could not afford a home could now buy one.

In addition to increasing demand from the local Hong Kong population, demand also increased due to the growing number of legal immigrants coming into the region. One reason for the rise in the number of legal immigrants coming into Hong Kong was the fact that Hong Kong in the 1980s focused more on developing its financial services industry than manufacturing. This change in focus resulted in a large number of firms, mostly from the US, Japan, Taiwan, and western Europe, setting up offices in Hong Kong.<sup>77</sup> Also the creation of Shenzhen as an SEZ in 1979 attracted many foreign companies, especially Fintech firms, because Hong Kong's close proximity gave these firms easier access to mainland markets.<sup>78</sup> Besides foreign businessmen, the number of foreign domestic workers, mostly from the Philippines and Thailand, also increased substantially during the 1980s and early 1990s, given that during this time wages increased, allowing households to now be able to partake in various luxuries such as maid services.<sup>79</sup>

The decrease in land supply during this era, on the other hand, is a result of the long-standing practice of land auctions that the British Controlled HKSAR government used to sell land. While under British control all of the land was owned by the government; who could decide how much land and for what price it would be sold.<sup>80</sup> This total control of land sales was problematic for the Hong Kong property market leading up to the 1980s because the manner in which the government would sell land was haphazard at best. During the late 1960s and 1970s the Hong Kong government reduced the number of land sales to historic lows, with at times there being no land sales at all.<sup>81</sup> The fact that land was sold randomly to the highest bidders during the 1960s and 1970s helped to inflate housing prices. But this inflation, as seen in Figure 2, actually began to decrease from 1980 to 1985 because the government began aggressively selling land, nearly tripling the amount of land sold compared to the previous decade.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, *Hong Kong 1991 Population Census*, 21. According to the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department when adjusted for an inflation rate of about 116%, the increase in median income was only about 56%.

<sup>76</sup> Stefan Gerlach, and Wensheng Peng, "Bank Lending and Property Prices in Hong Kong," *SSRN Electronic Journal*, (January 2004): 471, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1009153.

<sup>77</sup> F.L.N. Li., A.M. Findlay, and H. Jones, "A Cultural Economy Perspective on Service Sector Migration in the Global City: The Case of Hong Kong," *International Migration* 36, no. 2 (1998): 133, doi:10.1111/1468-2435.00040.

<sup>78</sup> Hong Kong Trade Development Council, "Innovation and Technology Industry in Hong Kong," *HKTDC Research*, (July 2018): 5.

<sup>79</sup> Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, *Hong Kong 1991 Population Census*, 54.

<sup>80</sup> Ruijie Peng, and William C. Wheaton, "Effects of Restrictive Land Supply on Housing in Hong Kong: An Econometric Analysis," *Journal of Housing Research* 5, no. 2 (1994): 268.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*




Figure 2. Hong Kong Housing Price Index, 1980-2018 (Data adapted from Hong Kong Rating and Valuation Department)

Even though it seemed that housing prices were starting to decrease, they started rising at an even faster rate starting in 1985 as a result of the ratification of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. During the 1980s and 1990s, the British controlled HKSAR government was preparing to end its lease and relinquish control of Hong Kong back to China in 1997. As a way to make sure that this transition would happen as smoothly as possible, the British and Chinese governments signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984. The reason that this deal was a major factor in the rise of housing prices is that in Annex III paragraph 4 of the Declaration, both governments agreed to restrict the amount of land available for private use to 50 hectares.<sup>83</sup> In conjunction with this, in paragraph 3 both governments agreed that these 50-hectare allotments would be sold at a premium, effectively inflating price.<sup>84</sup> The combination of land scarcity, artificial inflation, new restrictions on buying land, and an increase in demand, are what helped jumpstart the rapid rise of housing prices in Hong Kong during the late 1980s.

#### 1992-2019: Asian Financial Crisis and the Housing Bubble

As seen in Figure 2, housing prices continued to rise throughout the early and mid-1990's, with prices becoming too high for working class people to afford. In order to remedy this issue, the Hong Kong government tried various schemes to try to alleviate the pressure on its growing population. One such scheme, the Sandwich Class Housing Scheme (SCHS), was created to help subsidize housing costs in the early 1990s for the middle class. Ultimately these schemes did little to alleviate the burden that the rising housing prices placed on the growing populace. It was not until late 1998, when housing prices would start to decline as a result of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.

This Financial Crisis, which began in Thailand before spreading to the rest of East Asia, was started by a large amount of capital outflows from the region with the countries with the largest amount of outflows being: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand from 1996 to mid-1997.<sup>85</sup> In these five countries the amount of capital flowing into their economies dropped from \$93 billion to -\$12.1 billion, with the \$105 billion loss

<sup>83</sup> China, *Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong: Initialled on 26<sup>th</sup> September 1984, signed on 19<sup>th</sup> December 1984, ratified on 27<sup>th</sup> May 1985* (Hong Kong: Printed by the Govt. Printer, 1997), 161.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> Steven Radelet, and Jeffrey Sachs, "The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis," *NBER Working Papers Series*, (August 1998): 9, doi:10.3386/w6680.

constituting 11% of the combined GDP of these five countries.<sup>86</sup> The massive amounts of capital that was taken out of these markets caused their respective currencies to rapidly depreciate in value. In order to deal with the lack of capital and weakening currencies, banks started to raise interest rates which lead to a tightening on credit extension. Also, as interest rates rose and the exchange rates dropped the number of non-performing loans (NPLs), or a loan where the borrower has stopped re-paying interest and the principal, that these banks had on their books began to increase. Soon after this, rating agencies started downgrading these countries' debt as "junk", or debt that has a high likelihood of being defaulted on, with large amounts of defaults occurring in Thailand, triggering the crisis.

Unlike the five countries mentioned before, Hong Kong did not start feeling the full brunt of the crisis until August 1998.<sup>87</sup> The crisis essentially started in Hong Kong the same way it did in the other five countries that were mentioned. First, there was a large amount of capital withdrawals from Hong Kong, with nearly HK\$10.3 billion being taken out the year prior in 1997.<sup>88</sup> Then as more and more money left, the overnight HIBOR (Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate) began to increase and the Hong Kong Dollar's exchange rate began to fall. These events led to increasing rates of defaults and to the tightening of credit extension in the region. As credit tightened this meant that the number of loans available to people were now limited, meaning that what was once a tool used during the 1980s and early 1990s to buy a home, was now not available in ready supply. The lack of readily available credit, combined with the panic that people had over the worsening economy, caused the sudden drop in housing prices during the late 1990s and early 2000s, as there was a decrease in demand for new houses.

As the 1990s ended, housing prices continued to fall as the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis continued to be felt across East Asia. During this period, Britain's lease on Hong Kong ended, and they returned ownership and control back over to mainland China. This is important to note because it essentially ended the problem of illegal immigration as Hong Kong is now a part of China, and if someone wanted to move from the mainland to Hong Kong it would no longer be an issue.

As Hong Kong entered the mid-2000s, the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis began to wane, and the housing market started to come back to life, as now credit was no longer as restricted. Housing prices even continued their upward trajectory as many developed countries were sent reeling after the 2008 Financial Crisis. Housing prices only slightly dropped during late 2008 as the crisis hit western countries, but quickly rebounded as market sentiment remained good and the amount of capital inflows remained steady.<sup>89</sup> Seeing the problem that rapidly increasing house prices posed, the now Chinese controlled Hong Kong government, just like in the 1990s, implemented a number of housing schemes to try to alleviate the burden. From 2010-2013 the Hong Kong government tried to lower interest rates by lowering the Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio that mortgage loans in the region could have. The LTV ratio for all residential properties decreased from 70% to a range of 50-70%, depending on the size of the loan.<sup>90</sup> Additionally, the government instituted a new housing subsidy scheme in 2011 with the aim of subsidizing home ownership and freeing up rental spaces.<sup>91</sup> Despite these multiple attempts to minimize the burden on the people of Hong Kong, prices continue to rise. Currently, Hong Kong residents spend on average 64.7% of their monthly income on rent and 68% of their monthly income on mortgage payments, with LTV ratios ranging from 80-90%.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> K. K. Fung, and Ray Forrest, "Institutional Mediation, The Hong Kong Residential Housing Market and the Asian Financial Crisis," *Housing Studies* 17, no. 2 (2002): 192.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> Matthew S. Yiu, Jun Yu, and Lu Jin, "Detecting Bubbles in the Hong Kong Residential Property Market: An Explosive-Pattern Approach," *Journal of Asian Economics* 28, (2013): 119.

<sup>90</sup> Eric Wong, Kelvin Ho, and Andrew Tsang, "Effectiveness of loan-to-value ratio policy and its transmission mechanism: empirical evidence from Hong Kong," *The Journal of Financial Perspectives* 3, no.2 (July 2015): 4, 8. Under the scheme from 2010-2013 mortgage loans with a value of HK \$10 million or greater had a max LTV ratio of 50%, loans between HK \$7 million and HK \$10 million had a max LTV ratio of 60%, and loans less than HK \$7 million had a max LTV ratio of 70%. Under current regulations the max LTV ratio has been increased to 80% for loans up to HK \$10 million and 90% for first-time homebuyers with a maximum loan of HK \$8 million.

<sup>91</sup> Donald Tsang, "2011-2012 Policy Address by Chief Executive," (October 12, 2011): 2, <https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201110/12/P201110120136.htm>.

<sup>92</sup> Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, *Hong Kong 2016 Population Census*, 16, 23, 201, 203, 238, 314, 315; Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, *2018 Report on Annual Earnings and Hours Survey* (Hong Kong: Government Press, 2019), 5; Hong Kong Legislative Council Secretariat, *Statistics Highlights: Housing*

## Conclusion

From the end of World War II until about 1980, Hong Kong experienced a large wave of illegal immigration. The illegal migrants, mostly from Guangdong Province, poured into Hong Kong to flee the chaos back home on the mainland. This chaos included the Chinese Civil War (1945-1950), the Hundred Flowers Reform (1957), the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), and Cultural Revolution (late 1960s-1970s). Seeing the problem that mass migration posed for the region, the Hong Kong government instituted the Tough Base Policy (TBP), which said that all illegal immigrants who made it to the urban areas of Hong Kong could stay. After conducting an inquiry into the economic cost of the TBP, the government decided to repeal it and enforce harsher immigration laws to curb illegal immigration and prevent an unsustainable rise in the cost of living, especially housing.

The repeal of the TBP did curb illegal immigration, but the establishment of Shenzhen on the other side of the border also played an important role in the slowing down of illegal immigration. On the other hand, the TBP seems to have had no effect on housing prices like the government wanted. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s housing prices drastically increased because of a rapid decrease in land selling by the Hong Kong government and new housing policies enacted as a result of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984. Prices only began to drop, not due to the reduction in illegal immigration, but because of exogenous economic forces. The notion that the repeal of the TBP would be able to reduce the price of housing by reducing the number of illegal immigrants was flawed from the beginning. In 1997 Britain returned Hong Kong back to China, meaning that the notion of illegal immigration from the mainland into Hong Kong no longer existed. Also, the increase in the number of legal immigrants working in the financial and service industries has helped exacerbate the problem. In the end, it seems that the decision to repeal the TBP and deport illegal immigrants from mainland China was an easy fix to a very complex situation, that ultimately had little effect on housing prices.

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Affordability, 6th Legco., 2017-2018, ISSH12/17-18, 1 ; Hong Kong Rating and Valuation Department, *Hong Kong Property Review 2018* (Hong Kong: Government Press, 2018), 18; Hong Kong Rating and Valuation Department, *Hong Kong Property Review 2019* (Hong Kong: Government Press, 2019), 18; HKMC Insurance Limited, "Amendments to the Mortgage Insurance Programme," *Hong Kong Monetary Authority*, (October 16, 2019), <https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/press-releases/2019/10/20191016-3/>. Average mortgage-to-income ratio is based on a report by the Hong Kong Legislative Council calculated from 2017 mortgage and income data. Average rent-to-income ratio is based on the average monthly rent of a private residential whole house/flat (HK \$11318) and average monthly salary (HK \$17500) in Hong Kong as of 2018's wage and housing data, released in 2019. It should be noted that the percentages above do not include property taxes (aka Rates), which according to the Hong Kong Rating and Valuation Department, must be paid by both the property owner and occupier. Additionally, the percentages given are calculated without income taxes taken out.

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